STALINGRAD: BREAKOUT AND AIRLIFT OPERATION – A MATTER OF CHOICE?
Jens Wehner
Chief of the photo archive of Bundeswehr Military History Museum mhmeingang@bundeswehr.org
2 Olbrichtplatz, 01099, Dresden, Germany
Abstract. When journalists or certain historians in Germany judge about the events in Stalingrad, they often condemn German leaders like Paulus, Göring and Hitler for not breaking out of the cauldron. Of course there can be no doubt that they were responsible for the devastating defeat of the Wehrmacht in Stalingrad. But, had there really been a chance for a soon breakout when the Red Army had encircled the 6th Army in Stalingrad? The short investigation will show analyzed parts of German sources indicating that the 6th Army was already in big trouble before it was encircled by the Red Army.
Key words: Stalingrad, breakout, strategy, myth.
Historians tend to claim that the German 6th Army was doomed to be destroyed in Stalingrad because of the wrong decisions made by Hitler, Göring, and other generals in November 1942.
When the Soviet troops were closing in on 6th Army from 19 November 1942, 6th Army ought to have tried to break through the encirclement very quickly. Instead, the plan was for it to be supplied by means of an airlift operation.
The Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, Hermann Göring, is said to have promised to Adolf Hitler that «the necessary amounts could be flown into the encircled area of Stalingrad» by airlift.
This is commonly considered a decisive mistake, as 6th Army did not break out despite of warnings from the German Air Force, which considered such an airlift operation impossible [Beevor, Stalingrad, 310].
Colonel General Friedrich Paulus, the German Commander-in-Chief of 6th Army, and his superior, Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein, are criticised for the very same reason. Considering the operational situation and given the fact that supplying 6th Army by airlift was impossible, they should have ordered a quick breakout. This view is supported by the former Commanding General of the largest corps of 6th Army, General of Artillery Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach. In fact, Paulus had at first demanded permission from his superiors to break out [v. Seydlitz, 1977, 180 et. seqq.], which could have averted the disaster of Stalingrad [Ueberschär, Stalingrad, 25].
The false promises of Göring and Paulus’ hesitation are named as causes for the loss of 6th Army.
But how plausible, how realistic wouldthis demand for an immediate breakout actually have been?
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Situation of 6th Army before the encirclement
The situation 6th Army found itself in on 19 November 1942 was by no means suitable for quick and far-reaching military action. Its troops were exhausted and lacked some 74,000 personnel [Glantz, 2009, 662]. In mid-November, most divisions only had 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers left in the combat forces [Glantz, 2009, 718]. There was a reason why Paulus had stopped his troops from continuing the futile attacks even before the Soviet breakthrough [Glantz, 2009, 680].
Even before the encirclement, the supply situation had been very difficult, which added to the reduced combat power of 6th Army. The food rations had already been cut partially in October 1942. The main reason for the shortage was the limited capacity of the railway trains. Even Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4), which was deployed further to the west, had difficulties maintaining their supply chain [Kehrig, Stalingrad, 81].
In fact, 6th Army had already been short on supplies for several months. The most important supply goods were food, ammunition, fuel, and additional winter clothing. Twelve days before the Soviet breakthrough operation, the quartermaster of 6th Army noted that the horses of the Army were about to perish because the fodder supplies coming in by train were insufficient. Of the 31 trains they had demanded, only 8 finally arrived [KTB Qum, 07 November 1942, 58]. Only 40
% of the additional winter clothing that was necessary because of the harsh winter weather of the continental climate in Russia had been delivered [60]. The Army’s fuel supply was particularly critical. The incoming amounts of fuel were «by no means going to cover the needs», as the quartermaster wrote in his war diary. Instead of the 830 cubic metres he had demanded, only 436 cubic metres were delivered per
day [Ibid., 57]. The troops which had been assigned to the steppes were faced with extremely harsh conditions. They had to sleep in tents and earth holes. They were in a serious state of neglect and suffered from the bad hygiene [64].
Had 6th Army tried to break out towards the west, these would have been the troops that would most likely have encountered the armoured penetration forces of the Red Army first. The quartermaster’s files reveal quite clearly that, before the encirclement, the means of transportation – i.e. horses and vehicles – of 6th Army were most severely affected by the shortages.
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On 20 November 1942, with the Soviet encirclement operation having begun just the day before, the quartermaster of 6th Army reported: «Supply situation of fuel is extremely critical. If we use up the last reserves, we will probably be able to deploy the rapid response forces and many Army troops and provide these response forces with enough supplies to perform very limited tasks. ... The ... scheduled trains indicate that the incoming supplies will decrease strongly and will by no means be sufficient to meet the requirements» [KTB Qum, 20 November 1942, 237].
These lines make clear that 6th Army would not have had sufficient fuel at their disposal to move their vehicles even without the Soviet breakthrough.
The mobility of 6th Army was hence the major problem, followed by a generally critical supply situation.
Immediately after the encirclement, the quartermaster’s assessment of the situation had remained the same. «As there is enough food and ammunition, the first demand to be made is for more fuel supplies» [KTB Qum, 22 November 1942, 4 et seq.].
It must therefore be noted that the situation of 6th Army near Stalingrad had already been precarious even without the Soviet encirclement. It must be doubted whether6thArmy would have lived through the winter even with low-intensity combat.
Paulus’ scope of action
The retrospective demand that Paulus ought to have tried a breakout implies that he would have been able to act against the will of both the German High Command and Adolf Hitler. The long distance between Stalingrad and the German High Command back home seems to support this thesis. What could Hitler have done about it?
This idea is, however, not very realistic. In actual fact, Paulus’ scope of action was very limited. The minor act of withdrawal of 94th Infantry Division illustrates this fact: Commanding General Walther von Seydlitz gave orders for this division to withdraw from the unfavourable uncovered field positions in the Lataschamka region, in order to reduce the front along which the exhausted troops were fighting by one third to 20 kilometres. [Seydlitz, Stalingrad, 192]. When this retrograde move began in the night before 23 November 1942, the troops of Soviet 62nd Army immediately followed in pursuit, inflicting heavy losses on the German division. After this, Seydlitz had to dissolve the division and assign the remaining troops to
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two German armoured divisions [Seydlitz, Stalingrad 192]. It did not take long for German dictator Adolf Hitler to be informed about the unauthorized disengagement movement through a local radio team of the German Air Force. The German Air Force and the Army reported to Hitler through separate channels. Having received the message, Hitler immediately pressured Paulus to stop the retrograde movements [Seydlitz, Stalingrad, 202 et seq.].
This shows that, despite the considerable distance between his troops and the superior headquarters in Germany, any unauthorized action on the part of Paulus would not have gone unnoticed for very long.
What is even more important, however, is the fact that 94th Infantry Division had been crushed under the direct pressure of the pursuing forces of the Red Army in an open battle, and the retreat route of the German troops in Stalingrad was significantly longer than the distance 94th Infantry Division had to cover to reach more favourable positions. Several dozens of kilometres lay between the point near the city of Kalach where the Soviet “armoured pincers” where about to meet and the city centre of Stalingrad. The Red Army would hence have had much more time to destroy the exhausted, undersupplied elements of 6th Army. The surviving General Wolfgang Pickert, then Commander of 9th Flak-Division, shared this view of the situation even 25 years after the war [Pickert, Gedanken, 4]. General Schmidt, Chief of Staff of 6th Army, was convinced that an immediate with drawal of 6th Army would have found a «Napoleonic» end because of the lack of fuel and horses [Beevor, Stalingrad, 308].
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These arguments were well-founded, and they explain why Paulus hesitated to order a withdrawal off his own bat. Whether it retreated or tried to hold its position, 6th Army ran the risk of being crushed either way. In mid-November 1942, Paulus and his staff found themselves in both a military and a professional dilemma from which there was no way to escape. Paulus’ failure to order a retreat was hence not so much a question of character, even though this argumentation can often be found in literature [Diedrich, Paulus, 254 / Beevor, Stalingrad, 308].
It must hence be stated that Paulus did have a certain room for manoeuvre, but that his scope of action was far more limited than is often assumed. For one thing there was the German High Command which could have interfered immediately, and for another it was likely that the bulk of 6th Army would have been destroyed in a precipitate withdrawal across the open steppes.
The decision in favour of an airlift operation
In essence, the German commanders were aware of the unfavourable situation of 6th Army. To improve it, the required supply goods were to be flown in by airlift. The airlift operation failed, however, as it never reached the envisaged capacity. The reason for the unrealistic promises made by the German Air Force are commonly considered to be due to the heedless assurance the Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, Hermann Göring, had given to Hitler.
Leaving aside the discussion that the German High Command had on this matter, it becomes apparent that this accusation against Göring lacked a certain logic. Given
the situation of 6th Army, it was imperative to start the airlift operation soon. The Army was unsupplied and exposed in a barren urban/steppes landscape that offered no opportunities for a quick relief operation.
Should the German Air Force have kept its cargo aircraft to the ground under these circumstances? Had they done so, the Battle of Stalingrad as well as the infamous German war of extermination would certainly have ended sooner. From a present-day perspective such a decision may seem desirable, but it was no option from a military standpoint. According to this way of thinking, the German Air Force had to support 6th Army immediately instead of leaving its potential untapped [Pickert, Gedanken, 7]. Whether the German Air Force was ready for this or not was irrelevant at that time.
The responsible generals there were also aware of this fact. This becomes apparent in the telephone conversation between the Commanding General of VIII Air Corps, General Fiebig, and the Chief of Staff of6th Army, General Schmidt. Fiebig is said to have stated that he thought «supplying an Army [was] impossible» [v. Heinemann, Schicksal der 6. Armee, 4]; Schmidts answer is said to have been: «Then the Air Force will have to supply us» [Ibid., 5].
In retrospective, it becomes apparent that both generals were right in this dialogue. Providing sufficient supplies for 6th Army by airlift was impossible, and yet there was no alternative solution.
Later on, General Schmidt ended a second phone call with the same statement, this time in an even more unfriendly manner [ibid]. The former Chief of Staff of VIII Air Corps, Lothar von Heinemann, said after the war that he had had the impression that the Wehrmacht High Command generally preferred the Army over the Air Force. According to him, none of the higher-ranking Air Force commanders such as von Richthofen, Fiebig, or their chiefs of staff had been given the opportunity to reportin front of the Wehrmacht High Command during the Battle of Stalingrad. The Army, however, had sent many representatives to the Wehrmacht High Command, among them Captain and bearer of the Knight’s Cross Winrich Behr and other «hardly relevant persons». On these occasions, the latter had also spoken their minds on the Air Force and the Stalingrad airlift operation in front of the Wehrmacht High Command. This was another reason which pressured the Air Force to consent to the airlift operation, as otherwise the Army could later have blamed the Air Force for the loss of 6th Army [v. Heinemann, Einschreiben, 3].
Hermann Göring, too, tried to defend himself. According to German Air Force General Bruno Lörzer, he justified himself several times for the disaster at Stalingrad.
«Now that everything has gone wrong, they blame me... In actual fact, the situation was as follows: Hitler said to me: ‘Listen, Göring, if the Air Force cannot do this, 6th Army will be doomed!’ ... So I had no choice but to consent [to the plan], otherwise the Air Force and I would have been made the scapegoat» [Suchenwirth, Auskunft über Görings Stalingrader Zusage, 1].
This statement implies that there was a dialogue between Hitler and Göring that was quite similar to the one that took place between Fiebig and Schmidt on Stalingrad.
The conclusion to be drawn again is that there was no other military option than the airlift operation. In the middle of November, 6th Army had already been in such a bad state that it was impossible for it to break free from the encirclement. The airlift was the only possible way to deliver any supplies to the encircled troops within Stalingrad at all.
Attempted relief operation under consideration of the supply situation
It is a well-known fact that the German High Command planned a relief operation to set the 6th Army free by attacking the Red Army from the rear. For this operation, which carried the name Wintergewitter («Winter Thunder Storm»), troops had to be deployed to the affected sector of the German-Soviet front. The forward deployment took its time, and the situation of 6th Army in Stalingrad worsened even further. Commander-in-Chief [Colonel General] Hermann Hoth had orders to attack as early as 01 December 1942. But the arrival and concentration of the three armoured divisions that were to lead the German attack was delayed considerably. On 12 December 1942, Hoth decided to attack Stalingrad, even though his troops were not complete yet [Kehrig, Stalingrad, 307 et seqq.].
This schedule is of great importance when analysing the intentions of the German High Command concerning the airlift operation. The plan had in no way been to provide 6th Army with the full amount of supplies needed. Instead, 6th Army was meant to be supplied just enough to enable a speedy breakout. The Army’s armoured and motorised formations were hit the hardest by the shortages. This is why the Air Force was to deliver fuel and tank ammunition in the first place. According to Hitler’s order, 200 cubic metres of fuel and 30 tons of tank ammunition were to be flown in by airlift per day [KTB Qum, 29 November 1942, 18]. Food or winter gear, which later became crucial for the survival of many soldiers, were to be delivered merely in negligible amounts. A set of statistics from the Commander of all Air Force troops in the encircled area of Stalingrad, General Wolfgang Pickert, reveals this fact. In the first two weeks, only 49 tons of food were delivered, but 550 cubic metres of fuel and 570 tons of ammunition [Pickert, Tagebuch, 65]. The Quartermaster of 6th Army calculated that the rations would last until 08 December 1942 [Kehrig, Stalingrad, 300]. In contrast to that, the fuel status comprised 46 cubic metres on 24 November 1942 [ibid., 301].
Even the senior leadership of 6th Army itself does not seem to have been fully aware of its own supply situation. Wolfram von Richthofen noted in his diary that 6th Army had «rediscovered» a forgotten ammunition storage site on 29 November 1942 [v. Richthofen, Tagebuch Vol.9, 540]. The airlift operation was thus not designed to be kept up for as long as it finally was. It was only supposed to deliver fuel and other combat-related supplies to the encircled troops over a few weeks, until 6th Army would be relieved through Operation Winter Storm. The rations of the Army were reduced further [Kehrig, Stalingrad, 300].
When Operation “Winter Thunder Storm” was finally launched on 12 December 1942, it seemed for a while as if the plan of the German High Command might in
fact work out well. Thus the Quartermaster of 6th Army reported on 16 December:
«Incoming total: 125 tons of supply goods, thereof 2/3 fuels. The provided ammunition and fuel supplies are hence sufficient for the first operations envisaged; what we need to be flown in now is more food, particularly bread» [KTB Qum, 16 December 1942, 42].
According to this report, the airlift had successfully equipped 6th Army for a breakout, although it had not met the official requirements. But this plan essentially depended on the success of the relief operation of Hermann Hoth’s tank formations. The latter failed, though, due to the fierce Soviet resistance which finally brought «Winter Thunder Storm» to a halt [Kehrig, Stalingrad, 421 et seqq.]. The success of the Soviet defence sealed the fate of 6th Army.
It marked the beginning of the starvation and subsequent mass dying of German soldiers in Stalingrad. This could only have been avoided if the entire Army had received the full scale of supplies it required.
Conclusion
The defeat of the Wehrmacht at the Battle of Stalingrad is often presented as being the consequence of the failure of individual military leaders who made the wrong decisions: Hermann Göring, who heedlessly promised to provide sufficient supplies by airlift to curry favour with Hitler. The Commander-in-Chief of 6th Army, who ought to have acted against Hitler’s orders and should have made an attempt to break out immediately. This way of reducing history to a personal level is not very helpful as it obstructs the view of the underlying structures of World War II history. An objective analysis of the developments shows that the resistance of the Red Army within the city of Stalingrad had already placed 6th Army in a quite precarious situation before it was being encircled by Soviet forces. This surely was no coincidence, but rather the result of a long-term plan of the Soviets, which Anthony Beevor described as a trap [Beevor, Stalingrad, 277]. When the Soviet trap finally snapped shut, the German military leaders had not much room for manoeuvre left. Their only hope was to try and launch a relief operation with undersupplied air and ground troops – an attempt that had been prone to fail from its very beginning.
The fierce and persistent demands for supplies had obviously been neglected by the superior German Army Command. This was at least how the Chief of Staff of VIII Air Corps appraised the situation when he was on the scene. During the German attacks within the urban area of Stalingrad before the Soviet Operation Uranus, it had occurred more than once that the artillery units of 6th Army had to cease firing due to a lack of ammunition, while the anti-aircraft (Flak) artillery assets of the German Air Force kept firing [v. Heinemann, Einnahme Stalingrads, 1]. Considering these facts, the decisions Göring and Paulus made in this specific situation were reasonable from a military point of view. The reverse conclusion is that the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad were not individual decisions, but rather the fact that the planning of «Case Barbarossa» in 1941 and the
resulting «Case Blue» in the summer of 1942 was unrealistic and disregarded the actual circumstances and conditions.
After the success of the Soviet Operation Uranus, neither Hitler nor his subordinates had any considerable room for manoeuvre left.
This does, however, not relieve the higher-ranking military leadership of their moral responsibility. Hermann Göring was a war criminal and primarily responsible for the Holocaust. Friedrich Paulus, on the other hand, was a soldier who fought for a bad cause in a leading position, sacrificing the lives of many of his soldiers, and did not change his attitude until he was taken prisoner by the Soviets.
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