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[1462] Regarding the impact of encryption technology on computer forensic and criminal investigations see: See Huebner/Bem/Bem, Computer Forensics - Past, Present And Future, No.6, available at: http://www.scm.uws.edu.au/compsci/computerforensics/
Publications/Computer_Forensics_Past_Present_Future.pdf. Regarding legal solutions designed to address this challenge see below: Chapter 6.2.11.
[1463] Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Page 185.
[1464] "Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime", LMM(02)17; The Model Law is available at: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109CD2-5204-4FAB-AA77-
86970A639B05%7D_Computer%20Crime.pdf For more information see: Bourne, 2002 Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting: Policy Brief, page 9, available at: http://www.cpsu.org.uk/downloads/2002CLMM.pdf.; Angers, Combating Cyber-Crime: National Legislation as a pre-requisite to International Cooperation in: Savona, Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research, 2004, page 39 et seq.; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy Report 2005, UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/2005/1, 2005, Chapter 6, page 233, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdteecb20051ch6_en.pdf.
[1465] ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda / High-Level Experts Group, Global Strategic Report, 2008, page 49, available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/index.html.
148 Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Page 185.
[1467] Regarding practical approaches to recover encrypted evidence see: Casey Practical Approaches to Recovering Encrypted Digital Evidence, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 3, available at:
[1468] The issue is for example addressed by Recommendation No. R (95) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Problems of Criminal Procedure Law Connected with information, 11 September 1995: "14. Measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of the use of cryptography on the investigation of criminal offenses, without affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly necessary." and the G8 in the 1997 Meeting in Denver: "To counter, inter alia, the use of strong encryption by terrorists, we have endorsed acceleration of consultations and adoption of the OECD guidelines for cryptography policy and invited all states to develop national policies on encryption, including key, management, which may allow, consistent with these guidelines. Lawful government access to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism and to find a mechanism to cooperate internationally in implementing such policies. "
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[1469] For more information see Koops, The Crypto Controversy. A Key Conflict in the Information Society, Chapter 5.
[1470] The need for such authorisation if for example mentioned in principle 6 of the 1997 Guidelines for Cryptography Policy: "National cryptography policies may allow lawful access to plaintext, or cryptographic keys, of encrypted data. These policies must respect the other principles contained in the guidelines to the greatest extent possible."
[1471] This topic was discussed in the decision of the United States District Court of New Jersey in the case United States v. Scarfo. The District Court decided that the federal wiretapping law and the Fourth Amendment allow the law enforcement agencies to make use of a software to record the key strokes on the suspects computer (key logger) in order to intercept a passphrase to an encrypted file (if the system does not operate while the computer is communicating with other computers) See http://www.epic.org/crypto/scarfo/opinion.html
[1472] Export limitations for encryption software that is able process strong keys are not designed to facilitate the work of law enforcement agencies in the country. The intention of such regulations is to prevent the availability of the technology outside the country. For detailed information on import and export restrictions with regard to encryption technology see http://rechten.uvt.nl/koops/cryptolaw/index.htm.
[1473] The limitation of the import of such powerful software is even characterised as "misguided and harsh to the privacy rights of all citizens". See for example: The Walsh Report - Review of Policy relating to Encryption Technologies 1.1.16 available at: http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Crypto/Walsh/walsh.htm
[1474] See: Lewis, Encryption Again, available at: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/011001_encryption_again.pdf.
[1475] The key escrow system was promoted by the United States Government and implemented in France for a period of in 1996. For more information see Cryptography and Liberty 2000 - An International Survey of Encryption Policy. Available at: http://www2.epic.org/reports/crypto2000/overview.html#Heading9
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[1476] See: Diehl, Crypto Legislation, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, 2008, page 243 et seq.
[1477] "To counter, inter alia, the use of strong encryption by terrorists, we have endorsed acceleration of consultations and adoption of the OECD guidelines for cryptography policy and invited all states to develop national policies on encryption, including key, management. which may allow, consistent with these guidelines. lawful government access to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism and to find a mechanism to cooperate internationally in implementing such policies.", http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/formin.htm.
[1478] See for example: Antigua and Barbuda, Computer Misuse Bill 2006, Art. 25, available at: http://www.laws.gov.ag/bills/2006/computer-misuse-bill- 2006.pdf; Australia, Cybercrime Act, Art. 12, available at: http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/comact/11/6458/pdf/161of2001.pdf; Belgium, Wet van 28 november 2000 inzake informaticacriminaliteit, Art. 9 and Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 88, available at:
http://staatsbladclip.zita.be/staatsblad/wetten/2001/02/03/wet-2001009035.html; France, Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique, Section 4, Artikel 37, available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do;j sessionid=B78A2A8ED919529E3B420C082708C031.tpdjo 12v_3?cidTexte=J0RFTEXT000000801164&dateTexte=20080823; United Kingdom, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Art. 49, available at: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000023_en_1; India, The Information Technology Act, 2000, Art. 69, available at: http://www.legalserviceindia.com/cyber/itact.html; Irland, Electronic Commerce Act, 2000, Art. 27, available at: http://www.irlgov.ie/bills28/acts/2000/a2700.pdf; Malaysia, Communications and Multimedia Act, Section 249, available at: http://www.m3c.com.my/cyberlaws/act_communications.asp; Morocco, Loi relative a l'echange electronique de donnees juridiques, Chapter. III, available at: http://droitmaroc.wordpress.com/2008/01/29/loi-n%C2%B0-53-05-relative-a-lechange-electronique-de-donnees- juridiques-integrale/; Netherlands, Wet op de inlichtingen en veiligheidsdiensten 2002, Art. 89, available at
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http://www.legalserviceindia.com/cyber/itact.html; South Africa, Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provisions of Communications- Related Information Act, Art. 21, available at: http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a70-02.pdf;Trinidad and Tobago, The Computer Misuse Bill 2000, Art. 16, available at: http://www.ttcsweb.org/articles/computer-laws/computer-misuse-act-2000/compbill.pdf.
[1479] An example can be found in Sec. 69 of the Indian Information Technology Act 2000: "Directions of Controller to a subscriber to extend facilities to decrypt information.(1) If the Controller is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign Stales or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the Government to intercept any information transmitted through any computer resource. (2) The subscriber or any person in-charge of the computer resource shall, when called upon by any agency which has been directed under sub-section (1), extend all facilities and technical assistance to decrypt the information." For more information about the Indian Information Technology Act 2000 see Duggal, India's Information Technology Act 2000, available under: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan002090.pdf
[1480] For general information on the Act see: Brown/Gladman, The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill - Technically inept: ineffective against criminals while undermining the privacy, safety and security of honest citizens and businesses, available at: http://www.fipr.org/rip/RIPcountermeasures.htm; Ward, Campaigners hit by decryption law, BBC News, 20.11.2007, available at: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7102180.stm; ABA International Guide to Combating Cybercrime, page 32.
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[1481] Regarding the discussion about the protection against self-incrimination under the United States law see for example: Clemens, No Computer Exception to the Constitution: The First Amendment Protects Against Compelled Production of an Encrypted Document or Private key, UCLA Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 8, Issuel, 2004; Sergienko, Self Incrimination and Cryptographic Keys, Richmond Journal of Law & Technology, 1996, available at: http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v2i1/sergienko.html; O 'Neil, Encryption and the First Amendment, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, 1997, available at: http://www.vjolt.net/vol2/issue/vol2_art1.pdf; Fraser, The Use of Encrypted, Coded and Secret Communication is an "Ancient Liberty" Protected by the United States Constitution, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, 1997, available at: http://www.vjolt.net/vol2/issue/vol2_art2.pdf; Park, Protecting the Core Values of the First Amendment in an age of New Technology: Scientific Expression vs. National Security, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, 1997, available at:
http://www.vjolt.net/vol2/issue/vol2_art3.pdf; Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 150 Congress, Second Session on Examining the Use of Encryption, available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/pdf/00139296461.pdf.
Regarding the discussion in Europe about self-incrimination, in particular with regard to the European Convention on Human Right (ECHR) see Moules, The Privilege against self-incrimination and the real evidence, The Cambridge Law Journal, 66, page 528 et seq.; Mahoney, The Right to a Fair Trail in Criminal Matters under Art. 6 ECHR, Judicial Studies Institute Journal, 2004, page 107 et seq.; Birdling, Self-incrimination goes to Strasbourg: O'Halloran and Francis vs. United Kingdom, International Journal of Evidence and Proof, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2008, page 58 et seq.; Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Presumption of Innocence, COM (2006) 174, page 7, available at: http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=C0M:2006:0174:FIN:EN:PDF.
[1482] In this context see as well: Walker, Encryption, and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, available at: http://www.bileta.ac.uk/01papers/walker.html.
[1483] Regarding possibilities to circumvent the obligations see Ward, Campaigners hit by decryption law, BBC News, 20.11.2007, available at: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7102180.stm.
[1484] A detailed overview about the elements of search procedures as well as the challenges of carrying them ot is provided by the ABA International Guide to Combating Cybercrime, 123 et seq. For more information on Computer-related Search and Seizure see: Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, 1994, Vol. 8, page 75 et seqq.; Rhoden, Challenging searches and seizures of computers at home or in the office: From a reasonable expectation of privacy to fruit of the poisonous tree and beyond, American Journal of Criminal Law, 2002, 107 et seqq.
[1485] Regarding the threat that the suspect could manipulate or delete evidence and the related obligation to keep information about an on going investigation based on Art. 20 confidential see above: Chapter 6.2.9.
[1486] There are disadvantages related to remote investigations. Apart from the fact that direct access enables the law enforcement agencies to examine the physical condition of storage media physical access to a computer system it is the only way to ensure that the files on the suspects computer are not modified during the investigation. Regarding the importance of protecting the integrity of the examined computer system see: Meyers/Rogers, Computer Forensics: The Need for Standardization and Certification, page 6, available at:
http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/A0B7F51C-D8F9-A0D0-7F387126198F12F6.pdf.
[1487] Regarding the plans of German law enforcement agencies to develop a software to remotely access a suspects computer and perform search procedures see: Blau, Debate rages over German government spyware plan, 05.09.2007, Computerworld Security, available at: http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9034459; Broache, Germany wants to sic spyware on terror suspects, 31.08.2007, CNet News, available at: http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9769886-7.html.
[1488] See: Siegfried/Siedsma/Countryman/Hosmer, Examining the Encryption Threat, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 2, Issue 3, available at: https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/A0B0C4A4-9660-B26E-12521C098684EF12.pdf; Woo/So, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2002, page 521 et seq., available at: http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdl/v15/15HarvJLTech521.pdf; Spyware: Background and Policy issues for Congress, CRS Report for congress, 2007, RL32706, page 3, available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32706_20070926.pdf; Green, FBI Magic Lantern reality check, The Register, 03.12.2001, available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/12/03/fbi_magic_lantern_reality_check/; Salkever, A Dark Side to the FBI's Magic Lantern, Business Week, 27.11.200, available at:
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/nov2001/nf20011127_5011.htm; Sullivan, FBI software cracks encryption wall, 2001, available at: http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/book/FBI%20software%20cracks%20encryption%20wall.htm; Abreu, FBI confirms "Magic Lantern" project exists, 2001, available at: http://www.si.umich.edu/~rfrost/courses/SI110/readings/Privacy/Magic_Lantern.pdf.
[1489] See: McCullagh; FBI remotely installs spyware to trace bomb threat, News.com, 18.07.2007, available at: http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3- 9746451-7.html; Popa, FBI Fights against terrorists with computer viruses, 19.07.2007, available at: http://news.softpedia.com/newsPDF/FBI- Fights-Against-Terrorists-With-Computer-Viruses-60417.pdf; Secret online search warrant: FBI uses CIPAV for the first time, Heise News, 19.07.2007, available at: http://www.heise-security.co.uk/news/92950.
[1490] Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier.
[1491] A copy of the search warrant is available at: http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/ffles/timberline_affidavit.pdf. Regarding the result of the search see: http://www.politechbot.com/docs/fbi.cipav.sanders.search.warrant.071607.pdf; For more information about CIPAV see: Keizer, What we know
(now) about the FBI's CIPAV spyware, Computerworld, 31.07.2007, available at:
http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1605169326;fp;16;fpid;0; Secret Search Warrant: FBI uses CIPAV fort he first time, Heise Security News, 19.07.2007, available at: http://www.heise-online.co.uk/security/Secret-online-search-warrant-FBI-uses-CIPAV-for-the-first-time-- /news/92950; Poulsen, FBI's Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teed Who Teen Makes Bomb Threats, Wired, 18.07.2007, available at: http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2007/07/fbi_spyware; Leyden, FBI sought approval to use spyware against terror suspects, The Register, 08.02.2008, available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/08/fbi_spyware_ploy_app/; McCullagh, FBI remotely installs spyware to trace bomb threat, ZDNet, 18.07.2007, available at: http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6197405.html; Popa, FBI Fights against terrorists with computer viruses, 19.07.2007, available at: http://news.softpedia.com/newsPDF/FBI-Fights-Against-Terrorists-With-Computer-Viruses-60417.pdf.
[1492] Regarding the discussion in Germany see: The German government is recruiting hackers, Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams, 02.12.2007, available at: http://www.first.org/newsroom/globalsecurity/179436.html; Germany to bug terrorists' computers, The Sydney Morning Herald, 18.11.2007, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/World/Germany-to-bug-terrorists-computers/2007/11/18/1195321576891.html; Leyden, Germany seeks malware 'specialists" to bug terrorists, The Register, 21.11.2007, available at:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/21/germany_vxer_hire_plan/; Berlin's Trojan, Debate Erupts over Computer Spying, Spiegel Online International, 30.08.2007, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,502955,00.html
[1493] See: Tagesspiegel, Die Ermittler sufen mit, 8.12.2006, available at: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/;art771,1989104.
[1494] For an overview see Gercke, Secret Online Search, Computer und Recht 2007, page246 et seq.
[1495] The search function was in the focus of the decision of the German Supreme Court in 2007. See: Online police searches found illegal in Germany, 14.02.2007, available at: http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.3/online-searches.
[1496] Regarding investigations involving VoIP see: Bellovin and others, Security Implications of Applying the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act to Voice over IP, available at http://www.itaa.org/news/docs/CALEAVOIPreport.pdf; Simon/Slay, Voice over IP: Forensic Computing Implications, 2006, available at: http://scissec.scis.ecu.edu.au/wordpress/conference_proceedings/2006/forensics/Simon%20Slay%20- %20Voice%20over%20IP-%20Forensic%20Computing%20Implications.pdf.
[1497] This is the focus of the FBI software "magic lantern". See: Woo/So, The Case for Magic Lantern: September 11 Highlights the Need for Increased Surveillance, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2002, page 521 et seq., available at: http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v15/15HaryJLTech521.pdf; Spyware: Background and Policy issues for Congress, CRS Report for congress, 2007, RL32706, page 3, available at: http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL32706_20070926.pdf; See also: ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda / High-Level Experts Group, Global Strategic Report, 2008, page 49, available at: http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/index.html.
[1498] This is the focus of the US investigation software CIPAV. Regarding the functions of the software see the search warrant, available at: http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/timberline_affidavit.pdf.
[1499] Regarding this functions see: Gercke, Secret Online Search, Computer und Recht 2007, page 246 et seq.
[1500] Regarding the possible ways for an infection of a computer system by a spyware see: The spying game: how spyware threatens corporate security, Sophos white paper, 2005, available at: http://www.cehs.usu.edu/facultyandstaff/security/sophos-spyware-wpus.pdf.
[1501] With regard to the efficiency of virus scanners and protection measures implemented in the operating systems it is likely that the functioning of a remote forensic software would require the cooperation of software companies. If software companies agree to prevent a detection of the remote forensic software this could go along with serious risks for the computer security. For more information see Gercke, Computer und Recht 2007, page 249.
[1502] If the offender stores illegal content on an external storage device that is not connected to a computer system the investigators will in general not be able to identify the content if they do just have access to the computer system via a remote forensic software.
[1503] With regard to the importance of maintaining the integrity during a forensic investigation see Hosmer, Providing the Integrity of Digital Evidence with Time, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 1, available at:
https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/9C4EBC25-B4A3-6584-C38C511467A6B862.pdf; Casey, Error, Uncertainty, and Loss in Digital Evidence, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 2, available at:
[1504] https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/A0472DF7-ADC9-7FDE-C80B5E5B306A85C4.pdf.
1521 National Sovereignity is a fundamental principle in International Law. See Roth, State Sovereignity, International Legality, and Moral Disagreement, 2005, page 1, available at: http://www.law.uga.edu/intl/roth.pdf.
1522 See above: Chapter 3.2.12.
[1506] Based on Art. 7 "anyone running an establishment open to the public or any kind of private association where devices or terminals, which can be used for electrnic data transmission or other communications, are made available to the public, to customers or members" is obliged to require a licensce by local authorities and identify persons using the service. For more information see: Hosse, Italy: Obligatory Monitoring of Internet Access Points, Computer und Recht International, 2006, page 94 et seq
[1507] Decree 144/2005, 27 July 2005 ("Decreto-legge"). - Urgent measures for combating international terrorism. For more information about the Decree- Law see for example the article Privacy and data retention policies in selected countries available at http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/PracticeNote.aspx?id=2026.
[1508] For more details see Hosse, Italy: Obligatory Monitoring of Internet Access Points, Computer und Recht International, 2006, page 94 et seq.
[1509] Hosse, Italy: Obligatory Monitoring of Internet Access Points, Computer und Recht International, 2006, page 95.
[1510] Regarding the related challenges see: Kang, "Wireless Network Security - Yet another hurdle in fighting Cybercrime" in Cybercrime & Security, IIA-2, page 6 et seq.
[1511] Büllingen/Gillet/Gries/Hillebrand/Stamm, Situation and Perspectives of Data Retention in an international comparison (Stand und Perspectiven der Vorratsdatenspeichung im internationalen Vergleich, 2004, page 10, available at: http://www.bitkom.org/files/documents/Studie_VDS_final_lang.pdf.
[1512] Regarding the transnational dimension of Cybercrime see: Keyser, The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 12, Nr. 2, page 289, available at: http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol12_2/keyser.pdf.
Sofaer/Goodman, Cyber Crime and Security - The Transnational Dimension - in Sofaer/Goodman, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, 2001, page 1 et seq., available at: http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_1.pdf;
1530 See above: Chapter 3.2.7.
[1514] See Sussmann, The Critical Challenges from International High-Tech and Computer-related Crime at the Millennium, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 1999, Vol 9, page 451 et seq., available at: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/sussmann/duke_article_pdf.pdf.
[1515] Gercke, The Slow Wake of a Global Approach against Cybercrime, Computer Law Review International 2006, 141.
[1516] The need to speed up the process of international cooperation is pointed out in the Explanatory Report. See Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, No. 256: "Computer data is highly volatile. By a few keystrokes or by operation of automatic programs, it may be deleted, rendering it impossible to trace a crime to its perpetrator or destroying critical proof of guilt. Some forms of computer data are stored for only short periods of time before being deleted. In other cases, significant harm to persons or property may take place if evidence is not gathered rapidly. In such urgent cases, not only the request, but the response as well should be made in an expedited manner. The objective of Paragraph 3 is therefore to facilitate acceleration of the process of obtaining mutual assistance so that critical information or evidence is not lost because it has been deleted before a request for assistance could be prepared, transmitted and responded to."
[1517] See below: Chapter 6.3.9.
[1518] See Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, No. 243. The Member States have the possibility to limit the international cooperation with regard to certain measures (extradition, real time collection of traffic data and the interception of content data).
[1519] If for example two countries involved in a cybercrime investigation already do have bilateral agreements in place that contain the relevant instruments, this agreement will remain a valid basis for the international cooperation
[1520] Regarding the difficulties related to the dual criminality principle see: Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, Brigham Young University Law Review, 1992, page 191 et seqq., available at: http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/1992/1/haf.pdf.
[1521] The Explanatory Report clarifies that the determination of the covered offences does not depend on the actual penalty imposed in the
particular cases. See: Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, No. 245.
539 Regarding the dual criminality principle see: Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under the Dual Criminality Requirement, Brigham Young University Law Review, 1992, page 191 et seqq., available at: http://lawreview.byu.edu/archives/1992/1/haf.pdf.
[1523] See Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, No. 256: "Computer data is highly volatile. By a few keystrokes or by operation of automatic programs, it may be deleted, rendering it impossible to trace a crime to its perpetrator or destroying critical proof of guilt. Some forms of computer data are stored for only short periods of time before being deleted. In other cases, significant harm to persons or property may take place if evidence is not gathered rapidly. In such urgent cases, not only the request, but the response as well should be made in an expedited manner. The objective of Paragraph 3 is therefore to facilitate acceleration of the process of obtaining mutual assistance so that critical information or evidence is not lost because it has been deleted before a request for assistance could be prepared, transmitted and responded to."
[1524] See above: Chapter 3.2.10.
[1525] See Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, No. 256.
[1526] This information often leads to successful international investigations. For an overview about large scale international investigations related to child pornography see: Krone, International Police Operations Against Online Child Pornography, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No. 296, page 4, available at: http://www.ecpat.se/upl/files/279.pdf
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