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[1249] See above: Chapter 6.1.1.

[1250] See above: Chapter 6.1.3.

'268 See above: Chapter 6.1.4.

[1252] Mitchison/Wilikens/Breitenbach/Urry/Portesi - Identity Theft - A discussion paper, page 23, available at: https://www.prime- project.eu/community/furtherreading/studies/IDTheftFIN.pdf.

[1253] See: Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complain Data, January - December 2005, Federal Trade Commission, 2006, page 3 -available at: http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2005.pdf.

[1254] See above: Chapter 2.7.1.

[1255] Regarding the criminlisation of computer-related fraud in the UK see: Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations, 2006, Chapter 3.50 et seq.

[1256] One example of this is Section 263 of the German Penal Code that requires the falsity of a person (mistake). The provision does not therefore cover the majority of computer-related fraud cases:

Section 263 Fraud

(1) Whoever, with the intent of obtaining for himself or a third person an unlawful material benefit, damages the assets of another, by provoking or affirming a mistake by pretending that false facts exist or by distorting or suppressing true facts, shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine.

[1257] A national approach that is explicitly address computer-related fraud is 18 U.S.C. § 1030:

Sec. 1030. Fraud and related activity in connection with computers (a) Whoever -

(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct having obtained information that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or foreign relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it;

(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains -

(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et

seq.);

(B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or

(C) information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication;

(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer of that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the Government of the United States or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the United States;

(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;

[1258] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 86.

[1259] The drafters highlighted that the four elements have the same meaning as in the previous articles: "To ensure that all possible relevant manipulations are covered, the constituent elements of 'input', 'alteration', 'deletion' or 'suppression' in Article 8(a) are supplemented by the general act of 'interference with the functioning of a computer program or system' in Article 8(b). The elements of 'input, alteration, deletion or suppression' have the same meaning as in the previous articles." See: Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 86.

[1260] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 86.

[1261] With regard the definition of "alteration" in Art. 4 see Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 61.

[1262] With regard the definition of 'suppression" in Art. 4 see Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 61.

[1263] With regard the definition of "deletion" see Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 61.

[1264] As a result, not only data- related offences, but also hardware manipulations, are covered by the provision.

[1265] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 87.

[1266] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 88.

[1267] "The offence has to be committed "intentionally". The general intent element refers to the computer manipulation or interference causing loss of property to another. The offence also requires a specific fraudulent or other dishonest intent to gain an economic or other benefit for oneself or another."

[1268] The drafters of the Convention point out that these acts are not meant to be included in the offence established by Article 8 - Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 90.

[1269] The element "without right" is a common component in the substantive criminal law provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime. The Explanatory Report notes that: "A specificity of the offences included is the express requirement that the conduct involved is done "without right". It reflects the insight that the conduct described is not always punishable per se, but may be legal or justified not only in cases where classical legal defences are applicable, like consent, self defence or necessity, but where other principles or interests lead to the exclusion of criminal liability. The expression 'without right' derives its meaning from the context in which it is used. Thus, without restricting how Parties may implement the concept in their domestic law, it may refer to conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not covered by established legal defences, excuses, justifications or relevant principles under domestic law. The Convention, therefore, leaves unaffected conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful government authority (for example, where the Party's government acts to maintain public order, protect national security or investigate criminal offences). Furthermore, legitimate and common activities inherent in the design of networks, or legitimate and common operating or commercial practices should not be criminalised". See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 38.

[1270] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No 90.

[1271] "Model Law on Computer and Computer Related Crime", LMM(02)17; The Model Law is available at: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BDA109CD2-5204-4FAB-AA77-

86970A639B05%7D_Computer%20Crime.pdf For more information see: Bourne, 2002 Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting: Policy Brief, page 9, available at: http://www.cpsu.org.uk/downloads/2002CLMM.pdf.; Angers, Combating Cyber-Crime: National Legislation as a pre-requisite to International Cooperation in: Savona, Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research, 2004, page 39 et seq.; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Information Economy Report 2005, UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/2005/1, 2005, Chapter 6, page 233, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdteecb20051ch6_en.pdf.

[1272] The Stanford Draft International Convention (CISAC) was developed as a follow up to a conference hosted in Stanford University in the United States in 1999. The text of the Convention is published in: The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terror, page 249 et seq., available at: http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_249.pdf; For more information see: Goodman/Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, UCLA Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2002, page 70, available at:

http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf; Sofaer, Toward an International Convention on Cyber in Seymour/Goodman, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terror, page 225, available at: http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_221.pdf; ABA International Guide to Combating Cybercrime, 2002, page 78.

[1273] Regarding the ongoing transition process, see: "OECD Information Technology Outlook 2006", Highlights, page 10, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/59/37487604.pdf.

[1274] For more information on the effects of the digitalisation for the entertainment industry see above: Chapter 2.6.a.

[1275] The technology that is used is called Digital Rights Management - DRM. The term Digital rights management (DRM) is used to describe several technologies used to enforce pre-defined policies controlling access to software, music, movies, or other digital data. One of the key functions is the copy protection that aims to control or restrict the use and access to digital media content on electronic devices with such technologies installed. For further information, see: Cunard/Hill/Barlas, "Current developments in the field of digital rights management", available at: http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/sccr/pdf/sccr_10_2.pdf; Lohmann, Digital Rights Management: The Skeptics' View, available at: http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/20030401_drm_skeptics_view.pdf.

[1276] Regarding the technical approach of copyright protection see: Persson/Nordfelth, Cryptography and DRM, 2008, available at: http://www.it.uu.se/edu/course/homepage/security/vt08/drm.pdf.

[1277] For details see above: Chapter 2.6.1.

[1278] Examples are 17 U.S.C. § 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2319:

Section 506. Criminal offenses

(a) Criminal Infringement. — Any person who infringes a copyright willfully either -

(1) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, or

(2) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000,

shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, United States Code. For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement. [...]

Section 2319. Criminal infringement of a copyright

(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall be punished as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and such penalties shall be in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.

(b) Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1) oftitle 17 -

(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500;

(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (1); and

(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, in any other case.

(c) Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(2) of title 17, United States Code -

(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 3 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 10 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of $2,500 or more;

(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 6 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense under paragraph (1); and

(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.

(d) (1) During preparation of the presentence report pursuant to Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, victims of the offense shall be permitted to submit, and the probation officer shall receive, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim, including the estimated economic impact of the offense on that victim.

(2) Persons permitted to submit victim impact statements shall include -

(A) producers and sellers of legitimate works affected by conduct involved in the offense;

(B) holders of intellectual property rights in such works; and

(C) the legal representatives of such producers, sellers, and holders.

(e) As used in this section -

(1) the terms "phonorecord" and "copies" have, respectively, the meanings set forth in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17; and

(2) the terms "reproduction" and "distribution" refer to the exclusive rights of a copyright owner under clauses (1) and (3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive rights in copyrighted works), as limited by sections 107 through 122, of title 17.

Regarding the development of legislation in the United States see: Rayburn, After Napster, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6, 2001, available at: http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-a16-Rayburn.html.

[1279] Regarding the international instruments see: Sonoda, Historical Overview of Formation of International Copyright Agreements in the Process of Development of International Copyright Law from the 1830s to 1960s, 2006, available at:

http://www.iip.or.jp/e/summary/pdf/detail2006/e18_22.pdf; Okediji, The International Copyright System: Limitations, Exceptions and Public Interest Considerations for Developing Countries, 2006, available at:

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc200610_en.pdf; Regarding international approaches of anti-circumvention laws see: Brown, The evolution of anti-circumvention law, International Review of Law, Computer and Technology, 2006, available at: http://www.cs.ucLac.uk/staff/LBrown/anti-circ.pdf.

[1280] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 109.

[1281] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 110: "With regard to paragraph 1, the agreements referred to are the Paris Act of 24 July 1971 of the Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty. With regard to paragraph 2, the international instruments cited are the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The use of the term "pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken" in both paragraphs makes it clear that a Contracting Party to the current Convention is not bound to apply agreements cited to which it is not a Party; moreover, if a Party has made a reservation or declaration permitted under one of the agreements, that reservation may limit the extent of its obligation under the present Convention."

[1282] See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 111 "The use of the term "pursuant to the obligations it has undertaken" in both paragraphs makes it clear that a Contracting Party to the current Convention is not bound to apply agreements cited to which it is not a Party; moreover, if a Party has made a reservation or declaration permitted under one of the agreements, that reservation may limit the extent of its obligation under the present Convention."

[1283] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 16 and 108.

[1284] Article 61

Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.

[1285] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 113.

[1286] Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 114.

[1287] The element "without right" is a common component in the substantive criminal law provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime. The Explanatory Report points out: "A specificity of the offences included is the express requirement that the conduct involved is done "without right". It reflects the insight that the conduct described is not always punishable per se, but may be legal or justified not only in cases where classical legal defences are applicable, like consent, self defence or necessity, but where other principles or interests lead to the exclusion of criminal liability. The expression 'without right' derives its meaning from the context in which it is used. Thus, without restricting how Parties may implement the concept in their domestic law, it may refer to conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not covered by established legal defences, excuses, justifications or relevant principles under domestic law. The Convention, therefore, leaves unaffected conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful government authority (for example, where the Party's government acts to maintain public order, protect national security or investigate criminal offences). Furthermore, legitimate and common activities inherent in the design of networks, or legitimate and common operating or commercial practices should not be criminalised". See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 38.

[1288] See Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, No. 115. In addition the drafters pointed out: The absence of the term "without right" does not a contrario exclude application of criminal law defences, justifications and principles governing the exclusion of criminal liability associated with the term "without right" elsewhere in the Convention.

[1289] The Stanford Draft International Convention (CISAC) was developed as a follow up to a conference hosted in Stanford University in the United States in 1999. The text of the Convention is published in: The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terror, page 249 et seq., available at: http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_249.pdf; For more information see: Goodman/Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, UCLA Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2002, page 70, available at:

http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2002/03_020625_goodmanbrenner.pdf; Sofaer, Toward an International Convention on Cyber in Seymour/Goodman, The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terror, page 225, available at: http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817999825_221.pdf; ABA International Guide to Combating Cybercrime, 2002, page 78.

[1290] See Sofaer/Goodman/Cuellar/Drozdova and others, A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, 2000, available at: http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-draft.htm.

[1291] See Sofaer/Goodman/Cuellar/Drozdova and others, A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism, 2000, available at: http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-draft.htm.

[1292] See above: Chapter 4.4.1 and Chapter 6.1.

[1293] This was as well highlighted by the drafters of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime that contains a set of essential investigation instruments. The drafters of the report point out: "Not only must substantive criminal law keep abreast of these new abuses, but so must criminal procedural law and investigative techniques" see: Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 132. Regarding the substantive criminal law provisions related to Cybercrime see above: Chapter 6.1.

[1294] Regarding the elements of a Anti-Cybercrime strategy see above: xxx. Regarding user-based approaches in the fight against Cybercrime see: Gorling, The Myth Of User Education, 2006 at http://www.parasite-economy.com/texts/StefanGorlingVB2006.pdf. See as well the comment made by Jean-Pieree Chevenement, French Minister of Interior, at the G8 Conference in Paris in 2000: "More broadly, we have to educate users. They must all understand what they can and can't do on the Internet and be warned of the potential dangers. As use of the Internet grows, we'll naturally have to step up our efforts in this respect."

[1295] Due to the protocols used in Internet communication and the worldwide accessibility there is very little need for a physical presence at the place where a service is physically offered. Due to this independence of place of action and the crime site, many criminal offences related to the Internet are transnational crimes. Regarding the independence of place of action and the result of the offence see above: Chapter 3.2.7.

[1296] Regarding the challenges of fighting Cybercrime see above: Chapter 3.2.

[1297] The pure fact that the offender is acting from a different country can go along with additional challenges for the law enforcement agencies as the investigations even if similar substantive criminal law provisions and procedural law instruments are in place in both countries. In these cases the investigation never the less requires an international cooperation of the authorities in both countries that in general is more time consuming compared to investigations concentrating on a single country.

[1298] See in this context as well: Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime No. 134.

[1299] For an overview about the current status of the implementation of the Convention on Cybercrime and its procedural law provisions in selected countries see the country profiles made available on the Council of Europe website: http://www.coe.int/cybercrime/.

[1300] See Art. 15 - 21 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.

[1301] Hannan, To Revisit: What is Forensic Computing, 2004, available at: http://scissec.scis.ecu.edu.au/publications/forensics04/Hannan.pdf; Etter, The forensic challenges of e-crime, Australasian Centre for Policing Research, No. 3, 2001, page 4, available at:

http://www.acpr.gov.au/pdf/ACPR_CC3.pdf; Regarding the need for standardisation see: Meyers/Rogers, Computer Forensics: The Need for Standardization and Certification, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 3, Issue 2, available at:

https://www.utica.edu/academic/mstitutes/ecii/publications/articles/A0B7F51C-D8F9-A0D0-7F387126198F12F6.pdf; Morgan, An Historic Perspective of Digital Evidence: A Forensic Scientist's View, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 1; Hall/Davis, Towards Defining the Intersection of Forensic and Information Technology, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 4, Issue 1; Leigland/Krings, A Formalization of Digital Forensics, International Journal of Digital Forensics, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 3, Issue 2;

[1302] Patel/Ciarduain, The impact of forensic computing on telecommunication, IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 38, No. 11, 2000, page 64.

[1303] For an overview on different kind of evidence that can be collected by computer forensic experts see: Nolan/O 'Sullivan/Branson/Waits, First Responders Guide to Computer Forensics, 2005, available at: http://www.cert.org/archive/pdfFRGCF_v1.3.pdf.

[1304] Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a digital world, Harvard Law Review, 2005, Vol. 119, page 538.

[1305] For an overview about different forensic investigation techniques related to the most common technologies see: Carney/Rogers, The Trojan Made Me Do It: A First Step in Statistical Based Computer Forensics Event Reconstruction, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 2, Issue 4; Casey Practical Approaches to Recovering Encrypted Digital Evidence, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 3, available at: https://www.utica.edu/academic/mstitutes/ecii/publications/articles/A04AF2FB-BD97-C28C-7F9F4349043FD3A9.pdf; Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a digital world, Harvard Law Review, 2005, Vol. 119, page 531 et seq; Nolan/O'Sullivan/Branson/Waits, First Responders Guide to Computer Forensics, 2005, available at: http://www.cert.org/archive/pdfFRGCF_v1.3.pdf.; Siegfried/Siedsma/Countryman/Hosmer, Examining the Encryption Threat, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 2, Issue 3, available at:

https://www.utica.edu/academic/mstitutes/ecii/publications/articles/A0B0C4A4-9660-B26E-12521C098684EF12.pdf; UmbuO/Blundell/Slay, Google Desktop as a Source of Digital Evidence, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 5, Issue 1; Marsico/Rogers, iPod Forensics, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 4, Issue 2; Gupta/Mazumdar; Digital Forensic Analysis of E-Mails: A Trusted E-Mail Protocol, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 2, Issue 4; Hidden Disk Areas: HPA and DCO, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 5, Issue 1; Chaski, Who's at the Keyboard? Authorship Attribution in Digital Evidence Investigations, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 4, Issue 1; Howard,, Don't Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet Files, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 19, page 1233; Forte, Analyzing the Difficulties in Backtracing Onion Router Traffic, International Journal of Digital Evidence, Vol. 1, Issue 3, available at: https://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecii/publications/articles/A04AA07D-D4B8-8B5F- 450484589672E1F9.pdf;


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