Why the west likes neither Molotov, nor Ribbentrop 11 страница



 

Mackenzie, W. The secret history of SOE: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1945. London, 2002. P. 38.


 

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it became clear that Hitler had occupied Czechoslovakia “the wrong way”, because he had not occupied Zakarpatye. On March 21, 1939 the leaders of the Western world gathered in London in order to decide what to with the disobedient Adolf. As William Mackenzie writes, on March 23, 1939 Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, discussed with a pair of high-ranking spies projects of disorder, sabotage and provocations in the German rear1.

 

The spies were sober-minded, down-to-earth people. In case of war with Germany they suggested a way of bringing Germany to heel at one stroke. How could it have been done? The idea was to “shut off the air supply” to Germany by striking at two vulnerable places that the German economy had: Romanian oil and Swedish ironstone2. The German industry was sup-plied with these essential resources in sufficient quantities, but if oil could be imported from the USSR, the desired quantities of iron ore were to be imported only from Sweden. Before the war Germany imported ironstone from France (Lorrain), Spain and Sweden. After the declaration of the war France stopped its iron ore deliveries to Germany; the Spanish source was also unavailable, because the ore was normally carried through the territory of France, whereas at sea the German transports were blocked by the British and the French Navies. If England blocked the last Scandinavian channel, it would be the end: all the German blast furnaces and armament works would come to a stand, and the German army that had no (!) substantial quantities of munitions in stock would be unable to carry on war. But if Hitler were prevented from manufacturing arms at the very beginning of the Polish campaign, how was he supposed to crush Poland and arm the soldiers for the further attack on Russia? That was why before the war the British leadership did not issue instructions concerning detailed plans of sabotage operations. The situation did not change after the Polish campaign, either. Only in October 1939 they began to plan the operation related to scuttling a ship on the berth and blocking all work in the port where they filled ore into vessels3. At that time Poland was no more.

 

Mackenzie writes about amazing things in his “secret history of SOE”. In March 1939 the British sabotage experts proposed a complex plan of sub-version that included operations in Romania, Denmark, Holland, Poland,

 

Mackenzie, W. The secret history of SOE: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1945. P. 39.

Ibid. P. 48.

 

Ibid. P. 51.


 

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Bohemia, Austria, Germany, Libya and Abyssinia. It should be noted that the war had not begun yet! To realize the plan Colonel Grand suggested allocating budget of 500 thousand pounds and workforce of 25 officers. What surprises most if the following quote from his report: “If this proposal is adopted, it will be possible to finalize preparations related to Romania within three weeks and other preparations (see the list of the countries above. — N. S.) — within three to four months, i. e. by July a date will be determined when disturbances will break out simultaneously in the territories occupied by Germany”1. “July” here stands for July 1939,when none of the above mentioned countries was occupied. More so, the German command did not even have any plans of invading these coun-tries! But Great Britain was already in the know concerning their future occupation. The proficiency level of the British experts was so high that to arrange disturbances (successful disturbances would be later termed “revolutions”) they only needed money and a little time. Where had the British experts in sabotage upgraded their skills to such a high level? It is easy to answer this question; suffice it only to remember Russia in 1905 and February 1917 and Germany in November 1918.

 

A SOE operation that had never taken place proves the fact that England had no intention to fight Hitler. The chief of the operation is playing for time: they choose the tactic of carrying out the operation only in December 1939 after “thinking it out” two months. On January 2, 1940 Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, approved the plan. But Sir Winston at that time did not take charge of key questions, his time would come later. And those who were in charge — Premier Chamberlain and the Foreign Secretary Halifax — forbade their commandos to execute a subversive act against the Swedish mines. On February 15 the saboteurs tried to get approval for the planned act. But Halifax refused again, because it might easily render Hitler’s soldiers armless2.

 

So, it was not Poland that the Western diplomats cared about, rejecting Hitler’s peace initiative. Yet, to speak candidly, “the Polish component” in the position of the West that did not want to make up with Hitler was quite essential. But this component is not the one that historians are talking about. The West put forward the following condition for normalizing relations with

 

Mackenzie, W. The secret history of SOE: Special Operations Executive, 1940–1945. P. 39.

Ibid. P. 52.


 

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Hitler — withdrawal of all the German troops and reinstatement of Poland.

 

But no historian puts the following simple question:

 

How was Poland to be reinstated, once it was officially divided between Berlin and Moscow?

 

Part of the Polish territory was integrated into the Third Reich, and West Belorussia and West Ukraine became part of the USSR. Suppose Hitler agrees to reinstate Poland and gives back all the captured polish territories except Danzig and “the Polish corridor”. Does it mean that Stalin must also give back what he had got? How can it be done, if the new territories are officially integrated into the Soviet republics?

 

When Hitler pronounced his “peace-loving” speech, the new territories were not yet officially included into the USSR. But the process was set in motion: on October 1, 1939 the Politburo adopted the program of “Sovietizing” West Ukraine and West Belorussia. In the period between October 5 and October 12 the Red Army troops were stationed along the new borderline. On the newly-integrated territories they started to organize the polls for electing new state bodies. They were elected on October 22. In a week’s time (October 27–29, 1939) each territory declared the Soviet power and appealed to Moscow for inclusion. On November 1–2 the USSR Supreme Soviet satisfied the appeals. The process of negotiations between England and France, should Hitler had agreed to reinstate Poland, would have taken no less time. So by the time of a hypothetic agreement between England, France, Poland and Germany all the newly-won parts of Ukraine and Belorussia would have officially joined the USSR, and the casus belli to fight the main aggressor, i. e. Russia, would have been prepared.

 

Can a self-respecting power that has annexed a territory push it back to its former status after a couple of weeks? The integration of a new ter-ritory into a state is not as easy as switching on the light. One can switch an electric device on and off, but there is no “turning” a country on and off, like electricity. No one can respect a country that will change its own decision under someone else’s influence. The West did not declare war on the USSR, so Stalin had no reason to turn what had been officially acquired back to Poland “for the sake of peace”. How could he explain the change of his policy to the army welcomed by Byelorussian peasants with flowers in hands? Could he afford to admit that he’s gone too far?

 

Hitler had a different situation. He can normally include into the Reich German ancestral territories and give back the rest to Poland. And the people


 

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of Germany can understand this, unlike the people of the USSR, because the Polish campaign was begun to return the last German territories torn away according to the Versailles treaty. Germany’s world view treats this as follows: Germany has returned all its lands, and the world community displays understanding and agrees to make peace. The new reinstated Poland makes an agreement with Germany and guarantees inviolability of borders. Everybody is a true angel, unlike the Soviet Union that will look like a real aggressor that ought to be punished…

 

Eventually, if Hitler had backtracked and consented to reinstate Poland, it would inevitably have led to war with the USSR that was unable to return the Polish territories. That is the real cause of the West’s “reluctance” to make peace. It bears no relation either to peacefulness, or adherence to treaties, or the desire to curb the aggressor. It is only the continuation of the primordial Western policy aimed at stirring up confrontation between Germany and Russia. The glamorous condition of “reinstating Poland” foreboded no peace on the European continent; it simply marked changing from “phony” war to another, i. e. “real” war.

 

The logic of authors writing history books is amazing. No one accused the serial killer Chilatilo of violating the Highway Code in court. His disgust-ing crimes are sufficient grounds to send this inveterate rogue into eternity. Hitler, who is a much more disgusting criminal, is still being accused of all kinds of things. For example, they accuse him of perfidy and treachery. It is as ridiculous as charging a serial murderer with non- payment of community facilities. Hitler is responsible for taking the lives of millions. His atrocities are good grounds, over and above, to sentence him to death. But why attri-bute to him what he did not do? There is but one reason for this: to conceal those who helped him to come to power and pushed him to unleashing war. In any history volume one can find phrases about Hitler’s perfidy, judging by the fact that in his speech on October 6, 1939 he offered peace to the West and three days later ordered to draft a plan of attacking France. Thus some authors write about Hitler’s perfidy, without understanding what they are talking about, while other authors borrow this conception that travels from book to book. However, Hitler’s logic was quite normal…

 

The letter of instruction (№9) concerning the war in the West, signed by Hitler, quite accurately predicts the future defeat of the French army. This document is still currently important: “They (tank divisions. — N. S.)


 

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should by no means be thrown deathwards into the interminable warren of streets in Belgian towns”. Those who sent Russian tanks deathwards to assault the city of Grozny on New Year’s Eve in 1995, naturally, had not read Hitler. But after Hitler’s instruction General Guderian, treated as the best tank commander in Hitler’s army, also wrote in his works about the impossibility of a tank assault of urban structures, and then this idea was borrowed by war chiefs of all the countries. Didn’t Pasha Grachev know about such elementary things that the science of warfare has known about for over 50 years?

 

In his General Staff (on September 12, 1939) Hitler for the first time advanced the idea that he repeated two weeks later that it was possible to rout France the way Poland was routed, by blitzkrieg1. He did not go into detail, so far. On October 6 he made his “peaceful” speech. In Reichstag, he publicly mouthed the proposals that had already been secretly commu-nicated to the leaders of England and the USA. On September 26, 1939 he personally instructed Gцring that it was necessary to establish contact with London via Dalerus, the Swedish intermediary2. In the meantime, via Davis, an American petroleum producer, the German fuehrer communicated his proposals to President Roosevelt3. So Hitler’s peaceful proposals were to reach “the fertile ground”, which meant a possibility of the West changing its policy and coming to terms with Hitler on Germany’s equal position in the house that Jack the Englishman built. That was why Hitler’s speech was so peaceful that it could have done credit to any “champion of peace all over the world”. On the following day all the newspapers came out with meaningful headlines: “We do not pursue any military aims against England and France”, “No revision of demands except colonies”, “Arms limitation” and so on4.

Now, in the German fuehrer’s opinion, the governments of England and France could afford to stretch out friendly a hand to Germany without losing face. It was not the West that requested peace, it was Germany itself. It suggests that the peace offered by Hitler to the West was in real earnest. But the German fuehrer received no response to his initiative, or, rather, it was a negative response. On the following day the French premier Daladier

 

Falin, V. The second front. The anti-Hitler coalition: conflict of interests. P. 145.

 

Ibid.

 

Ibid.

 

Shirer, W. The rise and fall of the Third Reich. P. 66.


 

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told Hitler that France would not lay down arms until there was a guarantee of “genuine peace and general security”1.

 

Stalin positively distrusted his German partner in the non-aggression pact. While Hitler called on the world for peace, the USSR was quick in marching into the Baltic countries, having concluded with them cor-responding agreements. It was done with the sanction of Germany. But it did not lessen the significance of the appearance of the Red Army in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Baltic territories were vitally important for a would-be aggressor to deploy its troops for attacking the USSR. Now such a scenario was impossible. October 1939 marked also the beginning of negotiations between Finland and the USSR. The aim was to guarantee the security of the Leningrad direction and to take control of the entry into the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic sea for the Soviet Navy.

 

Yet, the main decision was to come from London, and it never came. However, judging by the tone of English, American and French newspapers it was getting clear that the West would not make peace with Hitler. On October 10 in Berlin’s Sportpalast Hitler made a short speech, trying once again to address Britain. He emphasized that Germany had “no reason to fight against the Western powers” and stressed his “peaceful” attitude once again. Britain answer came two days later, on October 12, 1939. Earlier Berlin saw street disorders later called “peaceful” disorders by historians. Early in the morning Berlin’s broadcasting network reported the collapse of the British government, saying that the new government of England would immediately start negotiations. The Reich’s capital felt exultant and powerful, but shortly the general mood was changed by disappointment2.

 

Why the state radio of the Nazi regime resorted to spreading false infor-mation is still a mystery. On the next day the British premier Chamberlain called Hitler’s proposals “vague and indefinite”. What the Englishman said further needs to be rightly understood. The head of England said that if Germany wanted peace, it must prove this by “deeds, not words alone”. Germany was to afford “convincing proofs” of striving for peace. The English premier called on Hitler to leave Poland and Czechoslovakia and guarantee his further peaceful behavior. This is what all historians say about Cham-

 

Shirer, W. The rise and fall of the Third Reich.

 

Ibid. P. 67.


 

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berlain’s speech. But it is a lie! The English premier called on Hitler to attack the USSR and, in such a way, afford “convincing proofs”. It was such “deeds,not words alone” that London expected from Hitler.

 

What was left for Hitler to do? He offered peace, but it was rejected. He had to prepare for fighting. So, in three days he ordered that a plan of crushing his closest enemy, France, be made. That was all his “perfidy”, or, rather, its absence. I do not mean to whitewash the murderer of millions of our people, I just want to clarify the logic of his actions.

 

The fact that the German fuehrer gave an order to make a plan of at-tacking France on the 9th of October and that the negative response from London came on October 12 does not signify any perfidy or ag-gressiveness on the part of Hitler. For one thing, to order that a plan be made does not mean to launch an offensive, because a plan should not necessarily be fulfilled, and an order, too, may be cancelled. For another thing, the 12th of October saw an “official reply” from London, while a non-official one could have come earlier. Judging by the headlines in the “independent” British press one can easily understand from what quarter the wind blows.

 

Adolf Hitler’s conduct was caused not by the crazy ambition of the invet-erate aggressor to conquer the whole world, but by the logic of a politician compromiser who did not want to fight his former patrons in real earnest. It should be stressed again: due to its geographic and economic situation Germany could not win a long-term war. It just had no resources for this. The situation with the “phony war” could neither last too long, because Britain would have strangled the Germans by imposing a blockade. To begin with, England was only mildly “palpating Germany’s throat”, but they could proceed to stifling Germany from breathing any moment. A scuttled ship in a Swedish port, together with “public unrest” in Romania resulting in destruction of the railway traffic, together with a couple of tankers with Romanian oil sunk on the Danube, and farewell to war.

 

The British intelligence service really had such a plan of torpedoing the German navigation. At first, the government naturally did not approve it. But after Germany brought troops into Romania, either invading or otherwise subordinating all the states of the Danube river basin, this method of sabotage became a real thing. The point is that when Hitler


 


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