Why the west likes neither Molotov, nor Ribbentrop 9 страница
The defeat of Poland was really a blitzkrieg. German armored columns easily breached Polish defenses and rushed forward. On September 8, the eighth day of the war, General Hoth’s tanks approached the Polish capital. Warsaw put up a heroic resistance till September 27 and then gave in. But the ruling figures that entangled the country into the massacre were no heroes. On receiving the earliest information of tank columns rushing to Warsaw, the Polish government escaped to Lublin (the 5th of September) and then crossed the Romanian border (the 17th of September). The chief com-manders of the army and the General Staff followed suit. About 500 Polish planes flew off to Romania, Latvia and Lithuania, instead of bringing down and ramming the enemy planes…2
They did not announce mobilization. Strictly speaking, two days before the war, on the 29th of August the government decided to do this, but they
According to some sources, on the 1st of September, when the war really broke out, Lieutenant Heinzel’s group began to carry out the same task: they seized the same Polish railway station, disarming the same Polish soldiers.
Isserson, G. S. The new forms of fighting. P. 63.
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changed their decision immediately: the pasted posters informing of the mobilization were removed from the walls of the Polish cities and villages. Why did they behave so strangely? They did so, because the ambassadors of England and France officially requested the Poles to put off the mobilization till August 311. At the same time the Western leaders were quite aware of the fact that the German invasion would take place early in the morning of the 1st of September. The official request of the Western diplomats was aimed only at enhancing the efficiency of the German army’s strike.
This aim was realized: the delay in Polish mobilization gave the German army effectual help2. Polish men would start to be recruited only when the country was being bombed out by the Germans. The railways and earth roads would be jammed by non-regulars, while the retreating troops mov-ing in the opposite direction badly needed reinforcement.
The Polish “morning after” came on. On the 1st of September Poland’s Foreign Minister Beck, the diplomat that had suddenly left for London, while being expected at the talks in Berlin, called up Kennard, the British ambassador in Warsaw, to say that the war between Poland and Germany had broken out. Warsaw expected an immediate response from its allies. The response was a note to the German government both from England and France, warning that unless Germany stopped the intervention, the Allies would meet their obligations towards Poland. In the meantime, London and Paris assured Berlin that the note was only a warning, not an ultimatum3. The foreign ministries of the Allies carried on making Hitler believe that they would not enter into the war on Poland’s side. Their main goal was not to stop the German aggression, which might lead to negotiations, but to step up hostilities with the view of Germany’s easy triumph over Poland and advance toward the Soviet border. Although the British king signed the mobilization decree concerning the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and the same was done by the French premier, Hitler was confident that the Allies would not declare war or, at least, would not open hostilities. He was
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Meltyukhov, M. Stalin’s lost chance. P. 98.
Poland had about 3 million soldiers, and over half of them had been trained after 1920. But a great number of these trained soldiers were not recruited: about
50 % of army potent males in September 1939 were beyond the Army (source: Isserson, G. S. The new forms of fighting. P. 5).
Volkov, F. D. Nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest. P. 27.
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anxious to defeat Poland as soon as possible, because it would liquidate casus belli. Even if they declared war, Hitler hoped that he would be able, onceagain, to come to some agreement with the West, once Poland was routed.
That was how Germany’s leader estimated the situation. He was not the only one misled by the maneuvers of the Western diplomats. The Polish leadership slowly began to realize that the pre-war pledges of England and France were just lip-service. Where are the planes they promised? Why don’t the allies bomb Germany? Why doesn’t France render assistance to Poland according to the agreement? When will France declare war on the aggressor?
The Polish ambassador in Paris posed these and other questions to the Foreign Minister of France Bonnet. Bonnet’s response makes clear that Paris wanted to give Hitler a few days start, so that the German Army could crush the Polish Army. Bonnet said that the French government would be able to deliver an ultimatum only after “the vote in parliament that would be in session in late afternoon”1. And the ultimatum that was to be delivered to Germany would expire only in 48 hours. Only then war might be declared.
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This response horrified the ambassador. It was easy to understand the despair of the Poles: they did everything they were told to do, now they were being beaten all to pieces, and there was no help coming. The desperate Poles changed from request to demand, insisting that the Allies’ commit-ments be fulfilled. On the evening of September 2, after the session of the French parliament, the Polish ambassador appealed to Bonnet again. The minister said that the question of the ultimatum was to be discussed at the session of the Council of Ministers. “Then the Polish ambassador lost patience and gave Bonnet a piece of his mind and demanded that an ulti-matum be urgently delivered to Germany”2. The similar episode took place in the British capital. On the night of September 3 the Polish ambassador was instructed to meet Lord Halifax and remind him of the commitments of the British government…
Thus, for three whole days Germany was at war with Poland that did not receive any military assistance…
The help pleas of the Polish government to England and France grew more and more persistent from hour to hour. What they needed most of all was the air force of the Allies. Now the Poles began to realize all their
Ovsyany, I. D. The secret of the war trigger assembly. P. 61.
Ibid. P. 62.
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mistakes they were caused to make due to “the guidelines” of their friends from London and Paris. Most of the Polish planes were destroyed at the air fields, and the Germans fully dominated in the air, bombing the Polish troops and obstructing mobilization that Warsaw had already delayed at the advice from London and Paris. Even a few air squadrons of the Allies over Germany might have radically changed the situation, but there was not a single plane, nor was it clear, if England and France would ever declare war on Hitler!
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It was the beginning of the vile and dirty political game on the part of the West that has come down in history as “the phony war”. On September, 3 England and France did declare war on the Third Reich. A Polish military mission urgently left for London. Naturally, the Polish generals intended to discuss joint efforts for crushing the aggressor. One can be hazy about the sentiments of these Polish patriots, because they had been kept wait-ing a whole week till General Ironside, the Chief of the General Staff received them!
When he received the Poles, he said at once that the British General Staff had no plan of military assistance to Poland and advised the visitors to buy weapons in neutral countries!1 On hearing the reaction of the angry Poles, he cushioned the blow by offering 10 thousand outdated Hotchkiss rifles, with 15 to 20 million cartridges. With German tanks tearing up to Warsaw and planes interminably raiding to finish off the surrounded Polish divisions, England suggested that Poland should resist the German tanks and planes with the help of outdated rifles.
That was not all! The depth of perfidy is, indeed, limitless! Even the outdated rifles were supposed to be delivered… in 5 or 6 months! Asa matter of fact, the whole war of Germany against Poland lasted less than a month2. London’s help meant full absence of the promised help. Poland was flagrantly betrayed by its allies. This betrayal will not seem the result of sheer stupidity or blindness, should the real goal of London and Paris be estimated properly. On the contrary, this betrayal resulted from the whole logic of the pre-war diplomatic maneuvers of the western governments and was the appropriate consequence of England’s and France’s policies.
Volkov, F. D. Nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest. P. 34.
The last major object of the Polish defense — the fortress Modlin — capitulated on the 28th of September, while the defenders of the port of Hel gave in on October 2, 1939.
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Pawel Wieczorkiewicz, the Polish professor of history, touches on this delicate matter in his interview: “Britain received early information on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact secret protocol received from von Gherwart, an officer of the German embassy in Moscow, which explains the British policy best of all. Of course, they did not share this information with the Poles, because it might have prevented the outbreak of war. However, it looks that if Warsaw had known about the German-Soviet pact, Poland would have had nothing to do, but surrender. In this situation to wage a war would be sense-less. I mean, senseless from the point of view of Poland, not Great Britain”1.
But, perhaps, England and France were unable to deliver their armaments and planes to Poland, because these weapons including planes were needed at other seats of war? As a matter of fact, that is how the British leadership explained their policy to the indignant Poles. Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, condoling with Raczynski, the Polish ambassador, said that Eng-land “could not afford to piecemeal forces needed for resolute actions”2.
There is no doubt that Poland fully realized the vile behavior of her allies. It is noteworthy that the Polish government in exile (in London) was com-posed of state servicemen quite different from the pre-war government. The point was that those betrayed by the British no longer wanted to cooperate with the betrayers. It was also more convenient for the British to communicate with people whom they had not promised anything.
But it was another pack of lies. The English and the French did not intend to undertake any military operations. The promised offense of the allied troops never took place. The mobilized French Army, together with the British troops, occupied their field works on the German border and stopped. True, some French military units advanced a few kilometers in the Saar area, but only after the Germans left, having mined the abandoned positions3. “Since mid-September the French Army had stayed on their defensive positions fortified in advance”4.
The newspaper “Rzeczpospolita”, September 28, 2005.
Ovsyany, I. D. The secret of the war trigger assembly. P. 66–67.
With Poland defeated, in October the French Army left the previously occupied square foot of German land, without any military pressure from the German troops, just not to provoke Hitler by hurting his feelings.
De Gaulle, Ch. The War Memoirs. The Call-up of 1940–1942. M., 2003. P. 9.
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More so, the French High Command ordered that the German positions not be gunned1. The British leadership also gave a command not to fire at the Germans. The giant British Navy was also inactive, in spite of a good opportunity to prevent the German ships from shelling the Polish positions at the Baltic coastline. To be quite candid, England and France really were unable to send their squadrons to Poland. The allied planes were busy… airdropping leaflets (instead of bombs) on Germany!2 On the morning of the 8th of September the English planes airdropped about 3.5 million leaflets over North Germany. On the night of the 10th of September they airdropped the same colored sheets of paper, instead of blast bombs, over North and West Germany. On the whole, in the period of time from September 3 to September 27 the British Air Force airdropped 18 million leaflets on the heads of the German citizenry. At the same time no bomb was dropped on the Ruhr industrial area. A French writer recruited into the army made the following note in his diary: “Not a single air raid on Germany. Not a single attack, no matter how insignificant, on German field positions. The daily communiquй says that “nothing serious has happened”, or that “during the night the front was quiet”3.
By the way, this was jotted down on September 18, 1939. Thus, it was the 18th day of Hitler’s aggression…
The only problem the leaders of Poland’s allies were faced with was try-ing to explain to their straightforward and straight- talking subordinates the reasons for such a strange behavior on the part of England and France. Later on the Western historians would come across the same difficulty — to explain, in a reasonable way, too, the incredible, yet typical, scene: French servicemen on one bank of the Rhein, doing one thing and another, in plain view of German servicemen on the opposite bank.
No shooting. There is no one trying to hide. The artillery is silent. No bombing…
A little time later the French government concerned about the leisure time (!) of the soldiers on the front would set up a special service of “enter-tainment” in the army. The boys in the trenches had really nothing at all to do, so the government decided to abolish a tax on playing cards “designed
Volkov, F. D. Nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest. P. 33.
Ibid. P. 33.
Grenie, F. The Journal of “the phony war”. M., 1971. P. 47.
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for the Regular Army”. The French War Department went as far as to buy 10 thousand footballs for “the Army Field Forces”. While the French soldiers played football, the German officers were watching them on the other side through wonderful Zeiss lenses of their binoculars and scope sights of their sniper rifles. But the Germans did not fire, because they followed the order: to refrain from active hostilities. They allowed only limited activities of military patrols and reconnaissance air force. Watching football matches played by the enemy was not forbidden…
While the German planes were bombing Poland, the English planes were airdropping leaflets over Germany instead of bombing the enemy territory
Like the French soldiers, the English soldiers occupied their trenches. They had no problem of disembarking on the continent. The German Navy was instructed to conduct a peaceful policy; so the British Expeditionary Force quietly, without any obstruction on the enemy’s part, disembarked in the French ports and began… to play football.
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The first war loss of the British army happened only three months and a week after the war began: the first English soldier was killed on December 9, 19391. The odd thing was that by October 11, 1939 there were 4 British divisions (158 thousand men)2. It is easy to see that there was only one casualty within 4 months of war against Germany. And the British historian Fuller justly wrote that “the world has never known such a bloodless war”.
It was rather difficult to find a rational explanation of such an idyll. That was why some high-ranking gentlemen could mouth obviously stupid things. When the Minister of the British Royal Air Force was suggested that they should drop fire-bombs on the German forests, he said: “No, it’s impossible. Do you understand that it is private property?”3
Could it be that England and France were not strong enough to fight Hitler, as some proponents of “the phony war” claim? Yes, they were. The military potential of each of these states was sufficient to organize an all-out offensive. The allies had four times as many soldiers and five times as many guns as Hitler’s army. Their armies had 3,286 tanks and about 1,500 planes, while second-rate worse- armed German divisions consisted of reservists of mature years with war munitions and spare rations for only 3 days, and there were no tanks and planes at all4.
After the war the German generals admitted at the inquest interroga-tions and in their memoirs that if the Allies had passed to the offensive at that early period of time, they might have easily advanced into the territory of Germany and occupied Ruhr, which would mean a complete end to the war only a month after its beginning.
“When war experts thought about the possibility of a French offensive right at the beginning of the war, their hair stood on end”, writes General Westphal5. General Halder was still more point blank: “In September 1939 the Anglo-French troops, without any serious resistance, could have crossed the Rhein and threatened the Ruhr area which, for Germany, is a decisive
Shirer, W. The rise and fall of the Third Reich. P. 55.
Ibid. P. 55.
Preparata, G. D. Hitler Inc. How Britain and the USA made the Third Reich. P. 373.
Taylor, A. The Second World War: Two approaches. P. 400.
Volkov, F. D. Nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest. P. 34–35.
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factor of fighting a war”1. Field Marshal Keitel was also perplexed, as he spoke at the Nuremberg trial: “We, the military order, kept waiting for a French offensive during the Polish Campaign and were very surprised that noth-ing was happening…If the French had advanced, they would have run into a covering operation instead of a real German defense”2.
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