Why the west likes neither Molotov, nor Ribbentrop 7 страница
The Western historians and political analysts like to dilate upon Stalin’s responsibility for unleashing World War II, but they do not like to men-tion facts. They appeal to the reader’s emotions. At present any person is well aware of the atrocities and cruelty of the Nazis. Hence, they make the conclusion that the USSR is not worthy of respect, because she concluded an agreement (non-aggression pact) with such brutes. It is common knowl-edge that the next week after signing the agreement Hitler attacked Poland. Hence they make the conclusion that Hitler is not the only one responsible for the aggression. It sounds fair enough, unless one remembers some “less significant” things.
Not only the USSR, but England, France and even Poland had signed their own “non-aggression pacts” with Hitler’s Germany. This is a normal practice in international politics.
If the Soviet Union had not concluded the treaty with Germany, the German-Polish war would have broken out all the same. And the USSR would have inevitably been drawn into war in a few weeks, in the au-tumn of 1939 (in the same way, the USSR had to be involved after Japan’s onslaught on Mongolia).
In a situation like that Japan, having suffered only a local defeat, was capable of resuming hostilities. If someone doubts such a chain of de-velopments, then it is necessary to turn back to the previous chapters of this book.
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Having rid the mind of idle talk and moral abstraction supplemented with adulterated facts one can get “a cold turkey”. Stalin was bound to conclude an agreement with Hitler to avert aggression from his country. No politi-cian of any time or epoch would oppose this statement by suggesting that in this situation another country may become a victim of aggression. Hitler unleashed the war not leaning on some document that he did not care a darn about, but thanks to an elaborate and long-term strategy of financial, political and diplomatic assistance that not only brought about a second birth of the previously stunted Germany, but also boosted an unprecedented growth of its might. It was not the USSR, or Stalin that rendered this assistance. But there is a great desire to go down in history as prominent peace-makers, pacifists and democrats! That’s what causes misinterpretation of historical events and shifting responsibility from the organizer (England, France, the USA) on the victim (the USSR).
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Stalin had no choice. But England and France, having sent a joint del-egation to Moscow for negotiations long before Ribbentrop, did have it. What they did not have was good will to conclude a treaty with the USSR, so it was not concluded. Suffice it only to look through the transcripts of the talks to make sure that the delegation was trying to buy time. There are a few key points.
On the first day they discussed the order of the day. The British and the French missions came up with a joint proposal that the morning session should last from 10.30 to 12.30 and the evening session should last from 17.30 to 19.00. Thus, out of 24 hours they proposed to use only 3.5 hours for nego-tiations. Why hurry, if the world war was going to break out only in 18 days?
The Soviet party immediately expressed its willingness to marshal a defi-nite amount of forces against the aggressor at a definite time1. The partners were supposed to follow suit. The position of the USSR was aimed at clearing up, what country at what time was supposed to mobilize a certain number of troops. But the French General Doumenc put forward 3 principles that would form the basis of a military convention:
‰ the formation of two stable fronts — in the West and in the East; ‰ the permanence of these fronts;
‰ the use of all forces against the enemy2.
Documents and Materials on the eve of World War II. M., 1981. V. 2. P. 247.
Bezymenskiy, K. P. 64.
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One can hardly make up a more indeterminate strategy. There is nothing concrete at all: Who forms these fronts? What are the time limits? What military forces are supposed to be used? Will these forces maintain defense or pursue an offensive? One would also wonder at the meaning of the odd expression “all forces” used by a grown-up and supposedly sensible West-ern military expert. Suppose the USSR raises an army of 120 divisions and England only raises 6 divisions?1 So, when asked, the British experts would only make a helpless gesture to suggest that they have no more forces! This is equal to seeing a tag in a shop with a price on it to say that a certain com-modity is worth “all the money that the customer has”!
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The nice phrase about “stable fronts” is also meaningful. When in 1941 the Nazis went for Moscow and Leningrad, the whole country suffering mul-timillion losses, the USSR hardly got any military assistance from England. But if Stalin had signed such a ridiculous convention, no one could have reproached the British gentlemen: their fronts were quite “stable”, because they were actually not engaged in hostilities. These hostilities would be “permanent” to the effect that “all” the 200 British tanks and 300 British planes were engaged, while the USSR would lose thousands upon thousands of units of weaponry…
Naturally, the Soviet Union was not satisfied with such fuzzy “principles”. But her attempts to make things clear were of no avail. The Soviet delega-tion could receive no definite answer as to what troops England and France would send to the Western front.
Here is a typical piece of dialogue in the negotiations.
— Our program suggests mobilizing one out of 16 divisions designed for the first stage of the war. In case war breaks out tomorrow, the num-ber of troops won’t be considerable, but in half a year the situation will change, — says the head of the British delegation.
— 16 divisions…When will they be mobilized after declaration of war? — Vorosholov asks.
— In the shortest time possible, — the British admiral says.
This sounds bombastic and too abstract. A military convention ought to specify a concrete period of time relayed to the outbreak of war and the
During the negotiations the French delegation proposed to raise 110 divisions, The USSR proposed 120 divisions and Britain proposed only 6 divisions (source: Kuznetsov, N. On the eve. P. 304).
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declaration of mobilization. If the USSR signed a document with the phrase “the shortest time possible”, that period of time might take years.
Here is another piece of dialogue between Voroshilov and the represen-tative of the French mission.
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— In case an attacked country is not Poland, but France, Poland will have to do for us what we are ready to do for her, — says General Doumenc.
— Could you make yourself more explicit, please, — the Soviet marshal asks.
— I personally don’t know the figures of the troops to be mobilized by Poland. All I know is that the Commander-in-chief of the Polish Army is bound to render us assistance by means of all available forces1.
Thus it goes on, day in and day out, twice a day, with a meal period: Voroshilov asks a question after which the Frenchman or the Englishman “skates around the rink”, pleading ignorance and promising to demand an explanation from the government.
Yet, these questions were not of paramount importance. Whatever the forces mobilized by the Allies against Hitler in the West, they might take the field immediately via the German-French and the German-Polish borders. To make contact with the enemy the Russian Army would have to enter into the territory of Romania or Poland. That was why the key issue was related to consent of the Poles or the Romanians to let the Red Army pass through their territories. Voroshilov raised that question at once. What was the answer of his negotiating partners?
If “all progressive mankind” had only a desire to stop Hitler, the Soviet troops on the territories of Poland and Romania would be a sine qua non condition to fight the aggressor. What alternative steps could be taken to help these countries? It was clear that neither Warsaw, nor Bucharest should oppose such a course of events. Otherwise, the treaty loses its significance. In case British and French governments are after triggering off a conflict between Germany and the USSR, the appearance of Soviet troops in Po-land and Romania will be undesirable. In this case Hitler might be stopped far off the Soviet borders by a joint effort of the Polish, Romanian and the Soviet troops. Consequently, it is necessary to refrain from giving an of-
Documents and materials… P. 224–229.
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ficial permission to the Red Army to enter into a country to be invaded by Germany. Deprived of the right to introduce the Soviet troops into Poland, Stalin will be either idly watching the Germans ravaging the country, or will have the cheek to cross the borderline. In the latter case he may be accused of aggressiveness; as a consequence, Stalin’s partners in the West will be at liberty not to fulfill their obligations to fight Germany.
One may come to a conclusion which is rather offensive to England and France. The main condition of Hitler’s onslaught on the Soviet Union was a preliminary defeat and occupation of Poland by the German army! England and France were not interested in annihilating the armed forces of aggressive Germany. What they cared about was Hitler’s resounding defeat of Poland, their ally. It was supposed to be a lightning rout, with as few Ger-man losses as possible. A long-lasting war was out of the question, because Germany did not have enough weaponry for such a war; and the Germans could not afford heavy losses either, so that they might attack Russia without let-up. With heavy losses in Poland, Germany would not be able to wage a war against the USSR. The fewer Nazi soldiers perish in Poland — the more of them will be able to go for Moscow. Simple arithmetic!
England and France did not steer their policies to organize the resistance that would make Germany easily defeated; on the contrary, their policies were directed at defeating Poland by Germany. It was thedesire to ensure Hitler’s victory over Poland that would cause “the phony war” that amazes modern historians.
— I ask you to answer my direct question… Do the General Staffs of Eng-land and France presuppose a transfer of the Soviet troops to East Prussia and other areas for fighting the common foe? — asks Marshal Voroshilov.
The Soviet delegation received no definite answer. Vague generalities replaced a clear-cut official statement.
The British Admiral Drax: “If Poland and Romania do not demand assis-tance from the USSR, they will soon turn into ordinary German provinces, and then the USSR will resolve what to do with them”.
The French General Doumenc: “I think, Mr. Marshal, Poland and Romania will beg you to come to their assistance”.
The British Admiral Drax: “In case the USSR, France and Britain are allies, I per-sonally think that Poland and Romania, without doubt, will appeal for help”1.
Documents and Materials… P. 230–239.
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But this is A PERSONAL OPINION, not an official standpoint! This is the opinion of the admiral who has no authorization and the opinion of the general who has no credentials “to discuss”. What can Stalin and Molotov say, when the Germans start their onslaught on Poland and the Poles bar the Red Army from entry into their territory? Will they say: “Admiral Drax has given his promise” or: “General Doumenc has assured us”? Of course, it is impossible. That is why Voroshilov insists on hearing an official standpoint on the issue of letting the Soviet troops enter into the territories of Poland and Romania. Each of the Western negotiators makes an enquiry to his government on August 15, 1939. It was already the second day of the negotiations started on August 12, but the basic ques-tion — how the Red Army was going to come to grips with the common foe — was not clear yet.
Another couple of days passed. “I would like to ask General Doumenc and Admiral Drax, when they expect the answer to our question from their governments”, — asks Voroshilov on August 17, 1939, trying to keep a cool head. One can easily imagine the answer of the negotiating partners. “In the shortest time possible”, — says General Doumenc. The negotiations had to be adjourned, as it made no sense to continue the debate without the response of the British and the French governments. The recess lasted 4 (!) days — till August 21, 1939.
It goes without saying that on August 21 there was no response from London and Paris. They resumed not because the participants had received information from London and Paris, but because the Soviet Union insisted on getting the talks back on course. The meeting was opened by Admiral Drax. The German onslaught on Poland was to start in less than five days. What does the British gentleman say? He tries to buy time again. “First of all, I must tell the marshal (Marshal Voroshilov. — N. S.) that we have gathered today in accordance with his urgently expressed wish. In my opinion, we ought to adjourn the debate for three to four days more…”1
It was clear that a treaty with England and France would not be con-cluded. The USSR made the last attempt to make an agreement with “the civilized world”, not with the aggressor. But England, France and even Poland did not want it. So the USSR had to make an agreement with Germany.
Documents and Materials… P. 239.
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The German ambassador von der Schulenburg handed the draft pact to Molotov as early as on August 19.
On August 21 at 17.00 Molotov delivered Stalin’s letter to Schulenburg. The letter was concluded by the phrase that changed the course of history and thrown the Anglo-Saxon plan of Hitler’s aggression into the gutter: “The Soviet government has missioned me to inform you of its consent to receive Mr. Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23”1.
It was the answer of the USSR’s leader to the German Chancellor’s letter received at 15.00. The road to the Pact was clear.
At that time France and England made the last attempt to torpedo the imminent German-Soviet treaty2. On the evening of August 21 at 23.00 Paris sent a telegram that authorized General Doumenc to sign a military convention envisaging entry of the Soviet troops into the territory of Poland. But it was only an attempt to buy time, not a genuine desire to sign a treaty with the USSR. This may be proved by the following transcript. On the morning of August 22, 1939 General Doumenc, the French representative, met with Marshal Voroshilov.
— I ask General Doumenc to acquaint me with your government’s docu-ment that I’ve come to know about from a letter. I would also like to know, if the English mission has received their government’s official statement concerning the same question.
— I have no such document, but I have received the government’s mes-sage that gives a positive answer to the main, cardinal issue. In other words,
The letter of the CPSU Central Committee J. V. Stalin to the Reichschancellor of Germany A. Hitler. AVP USSR. F. 0745. OP. 14. P. 32. D. 3. L. 65.
The governments of England and France came to know about Ribbentrop’s visit in next to no time and tried to change their position at the Moscow negotiations. This follows from a telegram of the Soviet ambassador in England Maiskiy: “The message concerning Ribbentrop’s upcoming flight to Moscow for signing a non-aggression pact was received in London on August 21 late at night. It caused quite a stir in the political and governmental circles. The predominant emotions were surprise, confusion, irritation and fear. Today in the morning the general mood was close to panic” (The telegram of the special representative of the USSR in Great Britain I. M. Maiskiy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 22.08.1939. Source: The USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War {September 1938 — August 1939} Documents and materials. P. 631).
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the government has authorized me to sign a military convention1, — said the Frenchman.
The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Moscow. August 23, 1939
Nothing is asserted definitely, there are no documents, and the British representative is missing. The trilateral type of negotiations has turned into the bilateral one. So the British party can always disown the results of such talks. Voroshilov wonders, if the British government will consent to sign a military convention.
— I do not know, if Admiral Drax has received any such consent from his government, but I know that the admiral agrees that the conference may go on2, — General Doumenc said.
So, it is not clear, if England agrees to let the Soviet troops cross the Western borders. Voroshilov asks Doumenc, if Poland and Romania do not object to passage of the Soviet troops into their territories. It appeared that France was tackling the question of letting foreign troops into the ter-ritories of her allies without getting the approval of their governments. It would give the Poles an opportunity to disclaim responsibility, if necessary, because they did not sign anything.
AVP USSR. F. 06. OP. 1a. P. 25. D. 12. L. 118–126 // The USSR in the struggle for peace… P. 635.
Ibid. P. 636.
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