Thus England and France did not know until lunchtime on March 23, if Slovakia would be integrated into the Third Reich.



 

Hitler spent 9 days (!) trying hard to give the false impression that Slovakia would not be integrated. Why? Because he decided to outdo his Western partners. During the second Czech crisis the British and French negotiators agreed that Hitler would occupy Czechia, Slovakia and Zakar-patye. As a matter of fact, Hitler annexed only Czechia. Neither Slovakia, nor Zakarpatye were incorporated into the German Empire. The territorial growth of Germany had not yet paved the way for Germany’s aggression against the USSR.

 

At the 18th Congress of the VKP(b) J. Stalin said: “You’d think that Germany got some territories of Czechoslovakia as a price to launch war against the Soviet Union, and now the Germans refuse to settle the bill and give their partners the brush- off”. Stalin spoke on March 10, 1939 . Four days before the declaration of Slovakia’s independence (March 14) Stalin foretold and accurately estimated Hitler’s conduct! Was he a clairvoyant? Did this remark in Stalin’s official speech make Hitler change the scenario? Most likely, the quiet diplomacy had born fruit, and Joseph Stalin already knew that Hitler was going to disappoint his friends in London and Paris. The West, as it turned out later, did not manage to respond, because Hit-ler’s moves at first fully fitted in “the deal” and only later showed a change of the scenario.

 

On the night of March 15, 1939 the German troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia and occupied the whole territory, except Transcarpathia. Instead of deploying the troops near the Soviet borders, Germany detaches itself from the USSR by the territories of the independent states of Slovakia and Hungary that shared Transcarpathia!

 

According to most modern historians and contemporaries the British and French political circles estimated Hitler’s decision of March 15 as a fatal mistake2. No one can realize the genuine tenor implying this phrase.

 

Shirer, W. P. 325.

 

“Early in the fatal day of March 15, 1939” is a typical assessment (source: Schmidt, P. Hitler’s translator. P. 164).


 

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The West took a tough line toward Hitler not because of his annexa-tion of Czechia, but because of his “non-annexation” of Slovakia and “non-occupation” of Transcarpathia! It blighted the plans of a promptaggression against the USSR. The West encouraged German Nazism, and agreed that Hitler should hold the Olympic Games, and closed the eyes to Germany’s large-scale rearmament and involvement in the Spanish war, and ceded to Hitler the territories of sovereign states. But its aim was not just to strengthen Germany in the political and military way.

 

As a matter of fact, Hitler played a trick on everybody: he joined Bohe-mia and Moravia to the Third Reich, subordinated Slovakia economi-cally and made a territorial gift to Hungary. France lost an ally and its prestige. Czech labor went to the Reich for better payments: by June 1, 1939 there were 40,000 thousand such workers. The same number of German workers could get into khaki and join the German Wehrmacht that included three tank divisions fitted out by Czech tanks and trucks1.

 

It is necessary now to analyze the situation in Zakarpatye. At first sight, there was nothing out of the ordinary, the mighty German Reich encouraging the local separatists and friendship burgeoning between Ukrainian nation-alists and German Nazis. All that was supposed to result in incorporating a territory into Germany that might further extend at the expense of Kiev, Poltava and Kharkov.

The preparation of the “Ukrainian bridgehead” began in due time. On October 27, 1938 in less than a month after joining Sudetenland, Augustine Voloshin was made the new premier of Zakarpatye. On November 9, 1938 he founded “The Organization of People’s Defense — the Carpathian Sich” (OPDCS), a force of local militants. The aim of these guerillas was not to defend their towns and villages from the Czechs, but to form something in the nature of a guerilla army to bring “freedom” to the inland of Soviet Ukraine. This explains the attitude to the OPDCS. Prague did not prevent from forming guerilla groups. More so, the Czechs even reached an agree-ment with Augustine Voloshin about training these groups by Czech officers. To arm the guerillas working for separation from Czechoslovakia the central government supplied them with weapons of the local Czech National Guards (Domombranstvo). The ball was set rolling so nicely that the 2nd Congress of

 

Bullock, A. P. 212–213.


 

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the OPDCS was a military parade of 10,000 militants marching across the town of Hust. Now that they had formed the main body of the Ukrainian army it was time to form state bodies for the sake of legitimacy.

The first thing to do was to name their country. On December 30, 1938 A. Voloshin’s government made a pleasant surprise to the German fueh-rer: Carpathian Ukraine — that was the official name of the autonomy. Before that, Zakarpatye “tried on” a few names, such as Podcarpathian Rus, Carpathian Rus, Zacarpathian Rus, Ugorskaya Rus, Podcarpatye.All of them were no good, because the aim of the expedition was Soviet Ukraine, and the name of the autonomy was to be associated with Ukraine, not Rus (Russia)1.

 

In February 1938 the process of legitimation is in progress: they hold elections and form local administrative bodies which consist of only ad-herents of separation from Czecho-Slovakia2 . There is no doubt about Augustine Voloshin’s partisanship. The head of the autonomy ordered that Main Kampf should be circulated about Zakarpatye. All the political par-ties, except Ukrainian National Union headed by Voloshin, were banned3.

Zakarpatye’s leadership had a special leaning toward the Germans. “All the citizens of the German nationality are allowed to join the German Party… form normal structures within this party and carry insignias and banners with the swastika emblem”4. On February 2, 1939 this “top secret” decree signed by Voloshin reached all the government branches. Formally, plurality and multiplicity were still there, because the political system admitted two parties: UNO (Ukrainian Nationalist Organization) and NSDAP, the party of German nationalists.

 

Zakarpatye is, indeed, Carpathian Rus. But the issue concerning the ethnic status of its population has not been settled, so, it is not clear which term — Ukrainian, or Russian, or Russinian — is more appropriate. In modern “democratic” Ukraine they deny such a nationality as Russinian.

 

On November 22, 1938 Prague recognized the autonomies of Zakarpatye and Slovakia, and Czechoslovakia was renamed into Czecho-Slovakia. But the hyphen in the country’s name did not save it from separation. What could have saved it was political determination that Prague lacked.

 

Prohibition on the activities of the political parties clearly points to the father of this method. First of all they banned the communist party (“the hand of Moscow”) and social democrats (“the hand of the West”).

Kiyevsky telegraf. №234.


 

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Only Ukrainian nationalists had a right to nominate a candidate for par-liament. There were 32 candidates for 32 parliamentary seats sanctioned by “monsignor” (Voloshin). To adapt the poll to the system of “the elder German brother” Voloshin set up his own concentration camp Dumen near the town of Rakhov. That was “a solution” for all dissidents and political opponents.

It is black and white that Voloshin rendered obedience to Hitler. When the German fuehrer gave Zakarpatye away to Hungary instead of support-ing the independence of Zakarpatye, Augustine ran away to Romania and then to Yugoslavia. He could have gone to any country, but finally he chose Germany. For some time he stayed in Berlin and then left for Prague that was to a great extent a German city. An absolutely free man, he worked as a lecturer at UFU (Ukrainian Free University). When Germany attacked the USSR, he appealed to Hitler for taking the position of the president of Ukraine. He also recommended the German fuehrer to liquidate the Or-thodox Church and replace it by the Catholic Church. At the end of the war this “champion of freedom” was arrested by the Soviet intelligence service and died in prison.

 

Naturally, such “democratic” elections in the spirit of German National Socialism bore the expected fruit. The “Parliament” in the town of Hust declared the independence of Zakarpatye on March 14, 1939 following Slovakia’s separation. But the events that happened later did not fit in the scenario. The German fuehrer made believe to be a sworn friend of Ukrai-nian nationalists to betray them as soon as he no longer needed to play- act before the West. The pro- German Zakarpatye worshipped and swore al-legiance to Adolf Hitler as if he were their “father” and God.

 

Yet, Hitler who supported the Slovaks did not support the Ukrainians. Right after the declaration of independence the first president of Zakar-patye went on the run, because the 150 thousand-strong Hungarian army encroached upon Transcarpathia1. The state friendly to Germany had not been long- lived; it took only 100 hours to be liquidated by another state friendly to Germany!

 

To avoid bloodshed the Hungarian government sent their parliamen-tarian to Hust with the bid for disarmament. The German ambassador von Voinovich demanded that The Ukrainians capitulate, but they refused. The armed groups of nationalists put up heroic resistance preventing

 

The all-Ukrainian newspaper “Dien” (“Day”). №69. 16.04.1999.


 

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the Hungarians from entering their “capital” to let “the government” run away. The militants were rather numerous — about 15 thousand men, with 15 tanks in the inventory1. But most Ukrainians were armed only with rifles and pistols. They held the front against Hungary’s standing army well equipped with artillery and other weaponry. Notwithstanding that, the Hungarian troops got bogged down in fighting, as they never expected the Czech military training to have turned the Ukrainian militants into an impressive force.

 

Unexpected succor came from the Polish army that struck the militants in the back. Why? Because an independent Ukrainian state was a threat, as West Ukraine made a considerable part of Poland and the Poles were ap-prehensive about losing this territory. This strike from behind the rear of the Ukrainian guerillas put an end to the warfare. Their defeat was partly due to the fact that the Hungarian army was supported by the Czech armed forces including even the police. The splintered militants began to retreat to Romania and hide in the local woods, but it did not help. The Romanian frontier guards chased and stripped them to the buff, like Ostap Bender, the hero of a famous Russian novel, and handed out to the Hungarians. The Hungarian citizenry armed with Czech weapons and assisted by the regular troops chased the hideaways and killed them on the spot extrajudicially. Those who surrendered to the Poles were shot down without exception. Ukrainian citizens of Poland, inhabitants of Galicia, came to help the militants of Zakarpatye, which caused the Poles “to clean up” the anxious nationalists. After the engagement the Hungarian troops handed out some Polish gunmen to the Polish frontier guards, and no one handled the war prisoners with kid gloves. The following day they were all shot down accord-ing to the “no trial, no record” principle2. In only six months such “outrages” against the law would be repeated with Polish army men, and the Germans would handle these prisoners of war still less softly…

 

It is worthwhile analyzing the events and the eventful dates of March 1939 to make sure that Adolf Hitler had become “an aggressor” not because he had annexed the helpless Czechoslovakia, but because he had broken his agreement with his Western partners.

 

Chuyev, S. The cursed soldiers: the traitors on the side of the Third Reich. M.,2004. P. 328.

Ibid. P. 331.


 

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March 14, 1939. Slovakia declares its independence and appeals toHitler for protection. Augustine Voloshin declares the independence of the Transcarpathian region, informs the German Foreign Ministry of this act and also appeals for protection of the newly-born pro-German state. The Czech president Gaha goes to Berlin.

March 15, 1939. President Gaha signs the agreement on incorporat-ing new Czechia under the name of Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia into the German Reich and saves his position as president of the country. At 6 a.m. the Hungarian army attacks Zakarpatye without any motive or explanation.

 

England was fully informed of the events 4 days in advance. So, the atti-tude of Great Britain towards “the aggressor” was that of patience and amity. It was expressed in Britain’s premier Chamberlain’s speech: “The parliament of Slovakia declared Slovakia an independent state. This declaration puts an end to the internal dissipation of the state whose boundaries we intend to guarantee. So, the government of His Majesty cannot, therefore consider itself committed to this guaranty”1. In other words, the Munich treaty has not been violated. Thank God!

 

The same day the British ambassador Henderson hands a note to the German government: “The government of His Majesty has no intention of interfering in the affairs concerning the governments of other countries…”2 Thus, England expresses no dissatisfaction, the tortuous phraseology suggesting an attempt to preserve appearances. It means that the current

events are taking place in full conformity with the scenario.

 

March 16, 1939. Hitler responds to Slovakia’s appeal for protection,but refrains from signing a treaty with them. Thus, the essential points for the Western diplomacy with reference to the annexation of Zakarpatye and Slovakia become foggy.

March 17, 1939. The German government declares holding a protector-ate over Bohemia and Moravia. The fog over Germany’s intentions is thin-ning. Hitler has incorporated only Czechia. Slovakia does not so far have any agreement with Germany on protection except the German fuehrer’s promise to take the Slavs under protection. The situation with Zakarpatye is more obscure: the encroachment of the Hungarian troops, combat ac-

 

Ribbentrop, J. von. P. 160.

 

Falin, V. The second front. The anti-Hitler coalition: conflict of interests. P. 69.


 

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tions and Hungary’s declaration of incorporating this Ukrainian region. These developments are no longer based on the elaborated scenario, and the stance of Germany is getting more and more elusive. So, the leaders of the Western world are beginning to worry.

In the morning Hitler received a warning in the diplomatic form. The first diplomat to file a note of protest was the French ambassador Coulondre. C. F. Weizsacker, the German diplomat that received him, did something unacceptable: he put the note back into the envelope, gave it to the ambas-sador and said that he would not accept any protest concerning the events in Czechoslovakia. He also advised that monsieur Coulondre should revise the text of the note!

The episode that followed might be described as funny but for World War II that broke out half a year later. The French ambassador insisted that Weizsacker should accept the note, as there was no reason why the French government should revise it. The German still refusing to accept the note, the Frenchman reminded him that it was common practice to voice the sentiments of some country to other countries. “In the end, Weizsacker left the note on the table with a comment that he would treat it as a mail item”1.

The British ambassador was the second one to follow suit. Naturally, the German diplomat treated him differently: he accepted the note and refrained from giving lip. “The British government has asserted that “it cannot help regarding the latest events as a complete retreat from the Munich agree-ment” and that “the military activities of Germany are fully illegitimate”2.

The US government also filed a protest note.

 

At that time “a brilliant idea” struck Britain’s premier Chamberlain. In his Birmingham speech he recanted his statement made two weeks before3. It was radiocast and everybody could hear that the leader of a Great Power commented on the disappearance of Czechoslovakia in the opposite way.

 

It is common knowledge that during World War II the governments of all the countries occupied by Germany found refuge in London. The govern-ment of Czechoslovakia was no exception. It is interesting to note the date of its “emergence” in the British capital: July 1940! In other words, the exile government emerged after 16 months of being wiped off the

 

Shirer, W. P. 328–329.

 

Ibid.

 

Ribbentrop, J. von. P. 160.


 

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political map of Europe. Why did it take Britain so long to sanction the government of a country that was “the victim of German aggression”? The reason was that Britain cherished hopes of making an agreement with Hitler and made efforts not to irritate him. Only after June 22, 1940, when France signed its capitulation in the Compiиgne forest, England actually got into a mess and started looking for allies. It was then that Britain provided the government of Czechoslovakia with a seat, time and money.

 

But nothing new happened in the period between the 15th and the 17th of March. Hitler swallowed Czechia, but the British prime-minister and his Foreign Office saw no “crime” in the fact. Two days later Chamberlain had to apologize for his “very reserved and discreet… somewhat cool and objective statement”. Then he changed tune and said: “We asserted that any question concerning our two countries must be solved through consulta-tion on a case-by-case basis. If it is so easy to find substantial reasons for neglecting solemnly and repeatedly proclaimed guarantees, it is only natural to pose the question, whether all other assertions from the same source are trustworthy”1.

 

What happened within the two days affecting the interests of Great Britain? It could not concern Czechia, because the country was no longer on the map even at the time of signing the first peaceful note. It could not concern Slovakia either, because the country would not withdraw from the idea of independence after its public declaration. Was it possible that England should be concerned about the fate of Augustine Voloshin’s self-appointed government? Or was the mutual amity between Britain and Germany threatened by the encroachment of the Hungarian troops into Zakarpatye? What did Hitler do to cause the head of the British government to sing another tune? Could it be for the sake of the Carpathian militants adoring the German fuehrer and his party that Neville Chamberlain was about to put at stake the friendship with the Third Reich?

 

Naturally, the reason for that radical change had nothing in common with the Ukrainian separatists. It was a matter of principle. FOR THE FIRST TIME Hitler had his own way disregarding the mutual agreement.

 

The West was no longer assured that Hitler would attack the USSR at an early date!

 

Schmidt, P. Hitler’s translator. P. 171–172.


 

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But Hitler still had a chance to mend the situation by annexing Slovakia according to the joint plan. That was why, though Chamberlain’s statement was voiced in a tough note, it was not a break-off. It was a warning.

 

March 18, 1939. Hitler goes to Vienna to celebrate the anniversary of theAnschluss. The Hungarian army occupies Hust, the capital of Zakarpatye.

 

March 19, 1939. London and Paris are actively analyzing the situation.R. Coulondre, the French ambassador in Berlin, writes to his chief, the for-eign minister G. Bonnet: “Following the Reich’s annexation of Bohemia and Moravia and introduction of the protectorate regime in Slovakia I would like to characterize the present situation, which has radically changed the map of Europe, and discuss the directions of development of the German dynamism, focusing on the question, if we can still believe that this dyna-mism is aimed only at the East, and trying to make some practical conclu-sions for our leadership. The facts testify that while planning the Bohemia and Moravia operation Hitler’s circle considered the possibility of moving farther to the east in the near future. According to the latest intelligence, the German army was going to occupy the whole of Slovakia and even Zakarpatye”1. This is what Coulondre writes in his letter.

 

Thus, there is hope that Hitler will go east. He only needs to come to heel. March 20, 1939. The US government recalls its ambassador from Ber-lin in protest against splitting Czechoslovakia — the event that took place

 

5 days (!) before.

 

March 21, 1939. The Lithuanian government is notified from Berlinthat tomorrow its plenipotentiary must take a special flight to the German capital to sign a document on cession of the city of Memel to Germany2. Refusal will cause the use of force on the part of the German government. Lithuania cannot wage war against Germany, while England and France refrain from any declaration in the defense of Lithuania.

At present the European diplomats have no spare time to deal with the Lithuanian question, because it is becoming evident that Hitler has got out of hand. The president of the French Republic accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs pays an official visit to London. “Chamberlain proposed that Britain, France, Poland and the Soviet Union make an official declaration

 

Documents and materials on the eve of World War II. M., 1948. V. 2. P. 49–50.

 

The other name of Memel is Klaipeda.


 

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of their intention to meet at high level for consultation on further measures to curb aggression in Europe”1.

“At one time the leaders of Europe have become aware of Hitler’s ag-gressive nature and realize now that he can be stopped not by concession, but by force”, — this is how historians assess the behavior of the British and French diplomats. They seem to ignore the following fact: three days before (March 18) the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov proposed holding a Euro-pean conference with the participation of France, England, Poland, Russia, Romania and Turkey2. Thus it was then that the Soviet Union had already proposed what Great Britain proposed now. But then Chamberlain thought this idea “premature”, and the French government vouchsafed no answer to Moscow’s proposal3. Why did the British premier reject the proposal of the Soviet diplomats? Why didn’t the French leadership respond to it? They had three days at their disposal to take some determined action after Hitler had swallowed the remnants of Czechoslovakia. What did the head of the British government wait for? Did he expect the German troops to withdraw from the occupied country overnight? Nothing of the kind. Chamberlain gave Hitler a chance to change his mind and… annex Transcarpathian Ukraine.

March 22, 1939. In the evening a Lithuanian delegation comes to Berlin, with Hitler on board the battleship “Deutschland” cabling to Berlin to order that the German squadron under his command will take Memel, either peacefully or by force.

March 23, 1939. In the rush hours of the morning (1.30) Lithuania signed the agreement on the cession of Memel to Germany4. By way of compensation, Lithuania “obtained” a free zone in their one-time own port. London and Paris did not respond to this new annexation, though England and France were the guarantors of the security of Klaipeda.

 

It made no sense then to delay solving the Slovakia question. Shortly after signing the agreement with Lithuania, Germany signs the “Treaty on Defense” between Berlin and Bratislava. The strange inertia of the German fuehrer, normally lightning-like in decisions, was due to his strategy of making an ambiguous situation. Hitler plays so artfully that his Western

 

Shirer, W. P. 337–338.

 

Ibid. P. 338.

 

Sipols, V. Y. The diplomatic struggle on the eve of World War II. M., 1979. P. 226.

 

Bullock, A. P. 219.


 

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partners are puzzled. On the one hand, he does not break his agreements; on the other hand he does not coordinate his actions with the West. While the West was busy trying to figure out his doings, he joined to Germany the last territory it had lost by losing World War I.

Hitler placed England and France before an accomplished fact prior to beginning a new round of talks with his partners. But in the new situation he would demand new terms. He had good grounds to believe that Germany would benefit from the talks with the West. Notwithstanding high-flown talk about the fate of the miserable Czechoslovakia, the Bank of England promptly transferred to Germany the Czech gold holdings of 6 million pounds stored away in London1.

On May 30, 1939 Weizsacker, the state secretary of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Astakhov, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, that there was a possibility to improve the Soviet-German relations. The Ger-man diplomat pointed out that Germany had refused the idea of annexing Zakarpatye, which meant annullingcasus belli

The backstage negotiations brought about the following result: the USSR and Germany began to move toward concluding the “Non-aggression Pact” that irritates modern historiography in the West.

Why did Stalin choose to conclude that agreement with Hitler? Why did Hitler go back on his anticommunist politics?

The reason is as follows: England and France knew well enough how to hold negotiations…


 

Preparata, G. D. P. 355.


 

 


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