It was more than a territory — it was a pretext.



 

Even the most flagrant aggressor, the most bloodthirsty dictator needs a peg to hang a thing on. The more life-like, the better. Hitler did have such a pretext. He was to take over Czechoslovakia with Slovakia that included Zakarpatye as its integral part!

England gave the fuehrer an ace of trumps by giving him an access to the territory populated by ethnic Ukrainians. Thus he had a stalking horse for his aggression. The USSR had Ukraine, and Germany had Zakarpatye. Is this clear!? A territory might be annexed. Especially, if some independent Ukrainian government pleaded with Adolf Hitler to do this…

In Munich England and France yielded part of Czechoslovakia to Hit-ler, and they knew beforehand that they would let him take the rest. They counted on a simple trick to violate the Munich guarantee they gave to Czechoslovakia and at the same time to observe their agreement with Hitler. On one occasion the British prime-minister Chamberlain said frankly: “It will be wrong to suggest that we are committed by this guarantee to ensure the existing borders of Czechoslovakia. The guarantee pertains only to unprovoked aggression”2.

 

The West guaranteed the integrity of the remaining part of Czecho-slovakia only in case of aggression against it. Thus no guarantee worked,if the country split up on its own! Such was the trick of Hitler’s takeover of Czechoslovakia. Both the aggressor (Germany) and the “appeasers” (England and France) acted according to the plan worked out in advance. Hitler was

 

Stalin, J. Conversation with Mr. Roy Howard, president of the American newspaperholding “Scripps-Howard Newspapers”. March 1, 1936, Moscow, Partizdat VKPB Central Committee, 1937. P. 6–7 (source: Martirosyan, A. A. Who brought the war to the USSR. P. 461).

 

Ovsyany, I. D. The secret of the war trigger assembly. P. 190–193 (see also:The Munich Treaty: Documents on the eve of World War II. 1937–1939. V. 1. November 1937 — December 1938. M., 1981. P. 237–239).


 

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playing the part of a naughty teenager, while the gentlemen from London and Paris performed benevolent and weak-willed tutors…

 

The map of Europe by the September 1, 1939

 

One may find something amiss in this speculation because of one little thing: according to the Munich treaty a small part of Zakarpatye was to be taken over by Hungary, not Germany. But the English and the French media of the day would give one the impression that European diplomacy did not set store by that fact. Though Adolph Hitler had not a patch of land inhabited


 

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by ethnic Ukrainians, the Western press raised hell provoking Hitler for aggression against the USSR. Solicitous journalists prompting the fuehrer to take a certain course gave it to understand that that course would have widespread support in the major capitals of Europe. “Why would Germany take a risk of war against England and France for their colonies, while in Ukraine it might gain much more?”1 — argued Gringoire, a Paris newspaper, on January 5, 1939. It painted a picture, laying it on with a trowel, of piles of foodstuffs, and grain, and mineral resources, awaiting the new occupant of Ukraine, so that it looked like a new bonanza. An that within call, a little over one hundred kilometers!

 

The hearsay that Hitler was about to send troops to Ukraine excited the world political stratosphere. Coulondre, the French ambassador in Germany, reported to Paris, referring to his talks with the Nazi leaders: “It looks that the methods and ways are still indefinite, but the general purpose seems to be clear: the creation of Great Ukraine, a Germany’s garner. To this end it is necessary to conquer Romania, reach an agreement with Poland, and detach some territories from the USSR. The German vigour will go to any length to have way, and there is talk in the military circles even about anexpedition to the Caucasus and Baku”2.

 

But due to an event that happened at that time the course of history changed. On the face of it, that was nothing out of the common. The history of the Soviet Communist party is riddled with congresses and still more with plenums. The March 10, 1939 saw Stalin presenting a current report. Stalin’s report was no ordinary thing, not only because it marked regular TV broadcasting3, or because he spoke about war. The war was touched upon by

 

Ovsyany, I. D. The secret of the war trigger assembly. P. 223.

 

It is noteworthy, that Hitler does not yet have a square foot of land, and the French ambassador is already talking about the fuehrer’s subsequent measures related to deploying the German army. To detach Ukraine from the USSR Hitler needs the territories of Romania and Poland. There is not a word about annexing Zakarpatye. Why? Is it because this question has already been discussed and settled? And now the Western diplomats are discussing Hitler’s further steps to realize the military conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union (Ovsyany, I. D. P. 222).

Early March 1938 saw the first pilot TV-broadcast networked from the Moscow Shabolovka TV centre. The trial show of the film “The great citizen” that highlighted the work of the congress was to pave the way for regular TV broadcasting. The people, though, had no TV-sets to watch the shows.


 

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many delegates to the 18th Congress of the VKPB, for example Molotov in his opening remarks, Manuilsky in his report on the work of the Comintern Executive Board, Beria, Chrushchev, Poskrebyshev, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mekhlis, Shaposhnikov, Budyony, Mikhail Sholokhov, Admiral Kuznetsov. What should attract historians is not the speech of any of these figures, but what Stalin said about war.

His report is so significant to gain insight into the sequel of events that I must appeal to the reader to hold his/ her breath and peruse the key-notes of Stalin’s speech that I will allow myself to comment on.

 

“Let me enumerate the most important developments over the period under review marking the outbreak of a new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacks Abyssinia and conquers it. In summer 1936 Germany and Italy arrange a military intervention of Spain, with Germany gaining a foothold in the Spanish Morocco and the North of the country and Italy in the south and Balearic Islands. In 1937 Japan seizes Manchuria, encroaches on North and Central China and occupies Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai, ousting its foreign rivals from the occupation zone. In early 1938 Germany annexes Austria, and in the autumn it seizes Czechoslo-vakia’s Sudetenland. At the end of 1938 Japan seizes Canton and at the beginning of 1939 it occupies the island of Hainan”1.

 

As this book is devoted to Hitler, it will treat only the German aggres-sion. But Japan had similar motives for war: it enjoyed the most-favored nation treatment on the part of England, France and the USA. Having made an assault on China, Japan reached the USSR borders before Germany and came to initiating military action at Khalhin-Gol and Lake Khasan. The two powers were preparing to strike Russia from west and east (one would be interested to know that the Olympic Games following the Berlin Olympics took place in Tokyo).

 

Japan has always been our neighbor, but to unleash war it is necessary to prepare footholds and work out a pretext. The conflict in Mongolia satisfied both the demands.

 

…“War is inexorable. It can’t be veiled. War is war, a military block is a mili-tary block, and an aggressor is an aggressor. The peculiar feature of the new imperialist war is that it is not yet a world war. Wars are unleashed

 

Stalin, J. The problems of Leninism. 2nded. M., 1946. P. 569.


 

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by aggressive states, such as England, France and the USA, constraining non-aggressive states to submit and yield one thing after another. Thus, one can witness a repartition of the world and spheres of influence at the expanse of non-aggressive states, without any resistance and even with a kind of laissez faire on their part. It is incredible, but it is a fact”1.

 

It was with concern that the Kremlin watched “the miraculous peaceful-ness” that had suddenly overcome the greatest world leaders. But Moscow cherished no illusions.

 

“What is it that makes the new imperialist war so lop-sided and odd? How could the non-aggressive countries have yielded their positions to the aggressor? Why had they failed, despite their military potential, to meet their obligations? Did they fail to resist because they were weak? Not at all! The collective economic and military potential of the non-aggressive democratic states was undoubtedly greater, than that of the Nazi states.

 

What accounts then for the constant cessions of their rights? Maybe, the fear of revolution explains it? But this was not the only and principal cause. The leading cause was renunciation on the part of most non-ag-gressive states, especially England and France, of collective security and, instead of it, sticking to the principle of non-interference, i. e. neutrality”2.

 

Interestingly, Stalin finds that fear of revolution is only the secondary cause of the western compliance. His speech that sounds like a shy brook at the beginning gains momentum, little by little, and by the end turns into a turbulent mountain stream.

 

“Formally, the policy of non-interference may be characterized as follows: “may every country defend itself from the aggressor the way it finds fit and according to its capacity; this is none of our business and no concern of ours; so, we’ll do trade both with the aggressor and its victims”. But in reality the policy of non-interference suggests turning a blind eye to the aggressor unleashing war.

 

The policy of non-interference implies the idea of appeasing the aggres-sor, letting him do evil; thus it suggests keeping out of the way when Japan rushes into war against China, or when Germany launches a war against the Soviet Union after making a mess of European politics. This

 

Stalin, J. The problems of Leninism. P. 570.

 

Ibid. P. 570–571.


 

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policy causes the opponents to be mired in conflict, encouraging each party on the quiet, to let them exhaust each other. Then, after they become weak enough, the policy-maker comes to the foreground with fresh troops, naturally, “in the interests of peace”, and dictates his terms to the war parties. Cheap and easy!1

 

Standing at the rostrum, Stalin straightforwardly discloses the western scheming, which would never be realized, but which, at that time, was the major threat to the state that he headed. Why wasn’t that threat realized? Because Stalin tells Hitler above board what is in store for him: exhausted in the war against the USSR, the Germans, as well as the Japanese, will be brought pressure to bear on by “non-aggressive states” following the “non-interference policy”.

 

“They gave way to Germany by letting it seize Austria despite their commitment to safeguard its sovereignty and Sudetenland. They left Czechoslovakia to sink or swim, violating all their obligations and then lying in the mass media about “the weakness of the Russian army”, about “the cachexy of the Russian air force”, about “the disorders” in the Soviet Union, encouraging the Germans to move farther to the East and tempt-ing them with easy game. The general purport was that once Germany rushed into war with Russia, it would be all plain sailing. No doubt, this gives an incentive to the aggressor and stirs up trouble”.

 

Conspicuous is the hullabaloo of the Western press over Soviet Ukraine. They screamed themselves hoarse about Germany going east, about Zakarpatye with its 700 thousand population that the Germans already had at their disposal, about the German annexation of Soviet Ukraine with its 30 million no later than in spring. It looks that this media frenzy aimed at enraging the Soviet Union against Germany poisons the atmosphere and stirs up a conflict with Germany without reasonable justification”2.

 

No comment is necessary. Stalin’s appeal to Hitler is transparent: they provoke you to attack us and provoke us to defend. And when we get bogged down in the war, they will come to divide our natural resources and shear Germany again. Do you want this, Adolf Hitler? Have you established your

 

Stalin, J. The problems of Leninism. 2nded. M., 1946. P. 570–571.

 

Ibid. P. 572.


 

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party to get Germany from the abyss into which the corrupt Weimar politi-cians had shoved for that end?

Then Stalin sets off a terrible information bomb. For the sake of absolute clarity he addresses Hitler directly!

 

“Still more conspicuous is the fact that some politicians and journalists of Europe and the USA, weary of anticipating a military campaign against Soviet Ukraine”, are themselves beginning to reveal the real cause of the non-interference policy. They communicate the true information and write in black and white about their disappointment with Germany, be-cause the Germans, instead of going east against the Soviet Union, have turned west claiming colonies for their nation. One might think that the

 

Germans have been granted the western regions of Czechoslovakia for levying war on the Soviet Union, and now Germany won’t settle the bill and gives the civilized West the brush-off.

 

I am far from expatiating on the topic of the non-interference policy and talk about treachery. It would be naпve to moralize to the people who reject moral values. Politics is politics, as the old hard-boiled bourgeois diplomats say. It should be noted, though, that the big and hazardous political game kicked off by the adherents of the hands-off approach may end in a setback.

 

That’s what’s behind non-interference, the prevailing European policy.

 

That’s the current political situation in the leading capitalist countries1.

 

In point of fact, Joseph Stalin, addressing the delegates to the Congress, summarized what had been going on in the world politics since his victory over Lev Davidovich Trotsky. Most historians are grossly mistaken thinking that the head of a state communicates with the head of hostile state through mass media, thinking that proposals of peace, alliance and friendship are made first at party congresses, or during parliament debates, or at press-conferences.

A direct or indirect address of a state leader to another state leader in a public utterance never suggests initiating an official contact or a proposal to initiate such a contact! It is no secret that besides official state diplomacythere is also quiet diplomacy that engages, instead of foreign ministers or ambassadors, some inconspicuous or obscure figures who start discussing perspectives of mutual relations between their countries. After long talks

 

Stalin, J. The problems of Leninism. P. 572.


 

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in a cafй or a tap-room in search of compromise, these figures begin to see how the land lies and then they get the green light from their leaders and, in a while, one of the leaders “suddenly” makes a public declaration that becomes a pivotal point in state-to-state relations.

 

There is a modern example of “beer diplomacy” that handles global prob-lems: a private meeting between Fomin (his real name was Alexander Feklistov), a Soviet counselor of the embassy in Washington and a KGB agent from the external intelligence department, and John Skulley, an American journalist from the ABC TV company, an authorized represen-tative of President Kennedy. Their supper in the Washington restaurant “Occidental” paved the way for the compromise settlement of the Carib-bean crisis and prevented a large-scale nuclear war1.

 

Those who doubt it may look back at Hitler’s way to power complicated by numerous clandestine activities that may do credit to a popular thriller. Remember all the “genius” decisions of the fuehrer in his foreign poli-tics. These decisions were due to his foresight, they resulted from simple knowledge of the way his “appeasers” were going to act. Who told him that France would not bring troops to the Rhineland? Who guaranteed London’s acquiescence at the news of Germany’s fast M-day build-up? Did the British and French ambassadors say anything like that? Naturally, they didn’t. All this came as the result of quiet diplomacy2.

 

No one ever informs the official diplomatic circles of their behind-the-scenes activity, because it may contradict the official position of the govern-ment. Why should the British ambassador in Germany know of England’s long-lasting complicated operation of Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union? He is supposed to obey the commands of his ministry and make public the position of his government in Berlin and present protest notes, though,

 

Vash tainiy sovetnik, №42 (271). 05.11.2007.

 

Some documents of the Nazi leadership concerning the problem of Czechoslo-vakia reveal the fuehrer’s “foresight of genius”. The Reichschancellor’s conference a year before the shameful capitulation of Czechoslovakia saw Hitler’s clear view of the Western policies: “The fuehrer thinks, that with great probability one may state that England and, conceivably, France have quietly filed Czechoslovakia away in storage and will be satisfied at Germany’s solution of the problem” (Yakobsen, G.-A. 1939–1945. The second world war // World War II: Two Ap-proaches. P. 81).


 

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unofficially, the fuehrer had long got the West European sanction for his impudent policies and knew quire well that the West would not respond.

Behind-the -scenes talks used to be a common thing long before the 20th century and cannot be put down to any particular culture. In the me-dieval history of Europe, one may find quite a number of references of secret missions, mysterious messengers and unexpected changes in the political climate. It doesn’t pay to get involved in the maze of history, as one can always find evidence of quiet diplomacy, even from come-at-able library books.

“In April 1938 the NKVD resident agent Ribkin stationed in Finland was summoned to the Kremlin where he was entrusted by the Politburo to do a special task… He was instructed to make a proposal concerning a mu-tual agreement to the Finnish government behind the back of the Soviet ambassador. Stalin emphasized that the aim to conduct was a search, so the proposal was to be made unofficially, i. e. without intermediary of the ambassador. Ribkin did as he was told to do. But the agreement was turned down. Nevertheless, it triggered off a discord in the Finnish leadership, and later Russia took advantage of it by making separate peace with Finland”1.

 

Pavel Sudoplatov was one of the chiefs of the Soviet security services and had the right to know a lot of things that even senior government officials didn’t know. But there were things that were a peg too high even for him. For example, he didn’t know anything about the subcurrent of the non-aggression pact with Germany: “Yet the non-aggression pact with Hitler was signed with dispatch that amazed me: only two days before signing the pact I was missioned to look for ways of peaceful settlement of our relationswith Germany. We continued sending our strategic proposals to Stalin and Molotov at the time, when the treaty had already been signed: Stalin had held the talks in utmost secrecy”2(emphasis added. — N. S.).

 

We are most unlikely to find out who and when initiated the secret contacts between Germany and the USSR. But such information is of less significance than the fact that such contacts had taken place. The excellent relations between the USSR and the Weimar Republic changed for extremely bad relations, when Hitler came to power. Yet, in the early 30-ies they began to improve without any obvious diplomatic measures: the leaders of both

 

Sudoplatov, P. A. Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin in 1930–1950.P. 75.

Ibid. P. 77.


 

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the states never met at high level, never shook hands; instead, they cursed each other. Within 11 months of 1933 the Soviet embassy in Berlin sent to the German home ministry 217 protest notes1, i. e. 20 notes a month! It so happens that except on their days off and holidays the Soviet diplomats protested every day!

The economic relations between the two countries had been seriously damaged. During the first half of 1933 the Soviet export to Germany was reduced by 44 %. Then Hitler’s government declared the bi- lateral trade agreement signed on May 2, 1932 null and void2. After taking office Hitler took pains to clear the German market from Soviet supplies. What did the USSR export to Germany? Essentially, it was the same power product that is exported by today’s Russia to today’s Germany. The lion’s share of the Weimar republic’s demands for oil and hydrocarbons was satisfied by Soviet supplies. To this end, they set up joint venture companies, such as Derunaft (Deutsche-Russische Naphtagesellschaft) that dealt in oil and Derop that dealt in gasoline and kerosene. After the Nazi party came to power, the USSR was promptly ousted from the market which availed the western oil monopolies and Germany’s new economic policy.

 

The Derop Company that served about 2,000 filling stations all over Ger-many was boycotted. Its board of directors and local branches in Berlin, Cologne, Dresden, Stuttgart, Munich and other cities of Germany were raided and searched. The employees, particularly the Soviet citizens, were detained, humiliated and released for failure of evidence. The Derop fuel stations, too, were robbed and destroyed by motorized storm-troopers, with the fuel being either made boot, or just let to leak away. Hitler was told to give out the order “to open a can of worms”, when he saw Soviet filling stations. Both politically and economically, this order seems to lack common sense3.

 

Is it reasonable to make war preparations against the USSR and keep importing its oil? The next day after the war breaks out, Stalin will turn off the taps to bring the whole German army to a standstill. But the problem is erased with supplies coming from the USA and Great Britain. Instead of

 

Martirosyan, A. P. 434.

 

Ibid. P. 434.

 

Gorlov, S. A. Top Secret. The Moscow-Berlin Alliance: 1920–1933. P. 296–297.


 

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Soviet benzene the fuel for Hitler’s tanks and planes will come from other sources: “Before the war one third of all the filling stations in Germany belonged to a German-American joint venture, one fourth was owned by Standard Oil, and the rest belonged to I. G. Farbenindustrie and the English trust Royal-Dutch Shell. Standard Oil was instrumental in storing up the amount of fuel worth 20 million dollars and building a refinery producing avgas1.

In April 1933, as well as on August 10 and November 1, 1934 Germany and England signed a number of bilateral conventions: a coal agreement, a trade agreement, a monetary understanding and a pay accord. According to the latter, England was to buy German goods to the tune of 100 pounds for every 55 pounds spent by Germany on buying English goods2. Germany had the right to convert the margin into pounds and spend it for buying any goods in the world market. It means that since Hitler came to power the British government had been pumping money into the German economy. That was partly the cause of the German “economic miracle”. At the same time the trade turnover was liable to change, because England knew quite well which side her bread was buttered on. In 1937 Nazi Germany bought British goods to the tune twice as much as two continents rolled into one and four times as much as the USA3.

 

In the meantime, the relations between the USSR and Germany soured. In the background of the obvious political animosity and economic unfriend-liness of the Third Reich the USSR takes a curious move: “It is necessary that comrades Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, M. M. Kaganovich, Tevosyan, Sergeyev, Vannikov and Lvov should submit for consideration a list of in-dispensible technical facilities to be ordered on account of German credit”4.

Judging by the quote, the Politburo did not doubt the positive response from Germany. However, there was no “trade boom” between the two countries. The names are remarkable, too: M. M. Kaganovich supervised the

 

Ovsyany, I. D. P. 44–45.

 

Martirosyan, A. P. 438–439.

 

Preparata, G. D. Hitler Inc. How Britain and the USA made the Third Reich.P. 229–230.

Decree of the Politburo of the VKPB Central Committee dated January 21 1939b №67/187 (source: Bezimeski, L. A. Hitler and Stalin before the fight. M.: Veche, 2000. P. 184).


 

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line of aircraft manufacturing, I. F. Tevosyan was in charge of shipbuilding, I. P. Sergeyev was responsible for war stores (!), B. L. Vinnikov managed the production of armaments, and V. K. Lvov was the Minister of Engineering. The scope of activity of these top managers suggests that they were not go-ing to buy toys or Christmas decorations. So why was Stalin so confident that the indispensible military equipment might be ordered in Germany, the dominant potential adversary of the Soviet Union? Who was able to guarantee that Germany, building up armaments to attack the USSR, would be executing the Soviet military orders?

 

Diplomatic correspondence will leave these questions unanswered; one had better look for the answers in the secret contacts between Germany and Russia that started in 1938. It looks that the head of the Third Reich was beginning to realize what he was in store for thanks to his “friends” from the European capitals. He was not ready to go to war on the Western terms, with the Polish bottle- neck in the rear of his army. Now that Ger-many had gained strength, he could afford to make his own terms instead of unquestionable acting in the interests of those who had brought him to power. It was then that the Soviet-German secret negotiations began to be realized…

 

We do not know the names of the negotiators. But they carried out their mission well, because on December 22, 1938 the Germans proposed to the Soviet trade agency in Berlin to sign an agreement. Germany offered extremely beneficial terms: a loan amounting to 200 million marks would make it possible for the USSR to buy German manufactured goods and was to be returned within two years by supplying raw materials to Germany. It was absurd to offer such easy terms to a potential enemy. One would never credit the would-be victim of attack; on the contrary, one would sooner borrow from him. Why would the German Nazi government take such a fancy to the Russian Bolsheviks?

 

The backstage negotiations must have been a success. The parties came to an understanding that explains the seemingly curious optimism of the Politburo decree based on the German proposals. A quest for a compro-mise was hardly an easy job, because Germany and the USSR pursued absolutely different aims. Stalin found it essential to get in touch with the potential aggressor that was gradually moving towards the Soviet borders in order to try to change the direction of this movement, to redirect it against the nurturers of the German Nazism. Germany’s economy was


 

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all militarized, war was exigent to ruin Russia, but Hitler was trying to launch it in the most favorable conditions. It should be borne in mind that Stalin had no alternative to normalizing relations with Germany; England and France had no intention of striking up “friendships” with Moscow with the view of averting the rising Nazi threat in Europe. The German leader must have felt like a bride being talked into choosing the right groom — either from the West (which meant sticking to the old scenario of attacking Russia, or from the East (which meant rewriting the whole play from cover to cover).

 

Both covertly (at first) and overtly (later) the Soviet diplomacy was making headway and finalized by entering into the Molotov — Ribbentrop Pact. At the same time the British negotiators showed uncompromising attitude at their talks with Germany; as a result, Hitler decided to break his deal with the West. What kind of commitments the German fuehrer had violated seems to be the most exciting page in the history of preparations of World War II…

 

Britain’s “peace-makers” and Germany’s “aggressors” gave a short notice to the rest of Czechoslovakia before it was swallowed up. On October 1, 1938 Germany occupied the Sudetenland and by mid-May 1939 assumed con-trol of the whole country. To learn more about this one can turn to history books which will also define Hitler’s behavior as treacherous and explain the “sudden clarification” of England and France, although it was obvious from the career of the Bohemian private first-class1 that he was by nature “a treacherous aggressor” and an incurable liar. History books lie, too, trying to cover up the harsh truth.

 

Hitler’s treachery and aggressiveness toward his Western partners and “creators” consists not in annexing the rest of Czechoslovakia, but in NOT HAVING DONE IT!

 

To understand this remarkable paradox one has to project oneself into that period of time, but not to London, or Paris, or the newly-built pomp-ous Reich Chancellery that Hitler occupied in Berlin. One ought to picture

 

That was how the German President Paul von Hindenburg named Hitler, giving his blessing to Hitler’s chancellorship. The fuehrer came from Austria, while Bohemia, a Czech region, belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Someone told Hindenburg that Hitler was a Bohemian, and wrong as it was the president kept this name for Adolf Hitler whom he did not like very much.


 

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oneself in Bratislava, a bohunk town, or to Hust1, an even more provincial-looking town in Zakarpatye; in a flash, these towns became centers of world political intrigues…

It should be remembered that the guarantees to Czechoslovakia given by Hitler were invalid in case of its dissolution. Consequently, it was necessary to build up the situation of irreconcilable differences inside the country within the shortest possible time to cause that dissolution. So separatism broke out like there’s no tomorrow. In comparison to the feud that rose between Czechs and Slovaks, the two brotherly nations, Shakespeare’s plays might seem rather dull. In 1918, when the new state of these brotherly Slavonic nations emerged from the shambles of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, it seemed inconceivable that the Slovaks would opt for separation. In the Habsburgs’ monarchy the Czech territory made part of Austria, and Slovakia was part of Hungary. After breaking from the “bonds” of the Empire, the Czechs and Slovaks declared Czechoslovakia a united and indivisible republic.

 

A historical paradox: when Hitler interfered in the Spanish war, humiliated the Jews in Germany and had the skulls of his fellow-citizens measured, the West took him to be a respectable politician. But scarcely had he refused to attack the USSR and swallow Zakarpatye, when he turned into “an impudent aggressor”

 

“The first division” of Czechoslovakia in November 1938 resulted in the cession of Zakarpatye with the cities of Uzhgorod and Mukachevo to Hungary; Hust was the capital of the remaining part of Zakarpatye in Czechoslovakia.


 

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But after the cession of Sudetenland the Slovaks began to hunger after independence1.

Prague promised the Slovaks autonomy and carried out the pledge: a new law was adopted on November 19, 1938 that recognized Slovakia’s autonomy including Ruthenia2, part of Slovakia populated by ethnic Ukrainians. That was Transcarpathia, the land that Hitler wanted badly on order to engineer a war against the USSR.

 

If some politicians in London or Paris really wanted to save Czechoslo-vakia they might have taken pains to avert the Slovak separatism. How? It sufficed to declare that they would never admit Slovakia’s independence3. Most European countries of the then period took their lead from England and France. So, of London or Paris should make such a declaration, it would shake the resolution of Bratislava to gain independence. But the western diplomats kept sitting at home…

 

The German newspapers, that only yesterday resented the violation of rights in Sudetenland on the part of the Czech government, now began to cry buckets over the sorry lot of the Slovaks. Tiso and Durchanski, the leaders of separatists deliberately appealed to Hitler to defend their country from the Czech “oppression”. The leaders of Zakarpatye acted in the same way. Their self-appointed government declared independence of the country. The developments fitted in the scenario. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was now a hard fact. Slovakia declares independence and breaks away, while Zakarpatye as part of this territory breaks away from Slovakia. Then the newly-proclaimed states appeal to Hitler to defend their sovereignty and the Fuehrer virtually incorporates them into the Third Reich4. The rest of Czechia — as a convenient jumping-off ground to attack the USSR — Hitler annexed without firing a shot:

 

 

Melnikov, D., Chernaya, N. Criminal number 1. P. 304.

 

The German name for Zakarpatye.

 

Transcarpathia was no big deal. Once Slovakia remains an integral part of Czechoslovakia, Transcarpathia remains, too.

Adolf Hitler violated the agreements their contents are inaccessible. Possibly, Slovakia was supposed to remain actually independent, with Zakarpatye actually incorporated into the Third Reich. But from the point of view of deployment of troops it was more expedient to swallow Slovakia, as well.


 

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the borders of the Third Reich came very close to the Soviet Ukraineseparated from it only by a thin belt of 140–150 kilometers (Poland’s West Ukraine)1;

 

Germany had a splendid opportunity to deploy troops on its newly-wonterritory;

 

under the circumstances the USSR could only watch the German troopsgearing themselves for war, but could not take any preventive measures without violating Poland’s sovereignty.

 

After deploying the troops and mounting an all-out attack, it was easy for Hitler to find a pretext due to Ukrainian nationalists. For example, the Soviet part of Ukraine might appeal to Hitler to liberate the people from the yoke of Bolsheviks. Besides, it was possible to set up a kind of protectorship named “Ukraine” to incorporate all its parts. In short, Hitler had a lot of variants at his disposal, the main condition being incorporation of Slovakia and Zakarpatye into his empire. That was the key problem he was faced with.

 

There was preparation work being done: as early as in 1929 champions of independence working for nearly all European intelligence services set up an organization of Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) headed by Colonel Eugene Konovalets. The organization united all those striving for “an independent and free Ukraine”. Konovalets twice met with Hitler who suggested that his adherents take a training course in the Leipzig Nazi Party School. The USSR was trying to keep on top of the developments. May 23, 1938 saw Pavel Sudoplatov planted into the OUN, as Pavlusya Valyukha made Konovalets “a present” — a box of chocolates with a bomb inside. So Konovalets died from the explosion in a Rotterdam cafй. He was substituted by another leader, Andrey Melnik, who had neither experience, nor charisma. Therefore, in the period 1938–1939 The OUN organization broke into two fractions, one headed by Melnik and the other by Bandera, after shoot-outs among the rank-and-file activists that claimed the lives of thousands.

 

On March 13, 1939 during the visit of the leader of the Slovak nationalists to Berlin he was instructed to call a special session of the Slovak parliament (Seim) to declare the independence of Slovakia. Next day Slovakia’s premier made this declaration in parliament. The attempts of some delegates to

 

The Soviet Union made some adjustments after World War II. Therefore, the situation of 1938–1939 does not conform to the modern maps, as the present-day Slovakia shares borders with Ukraine.


 

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How Adolf Hitler turned into an “impudent agressor” in just one day

 

discuss the question were nipped in the bud. Thus, March 14, 1939 saw an independent Slovakia. As expected, the new state immediately appealed to Hitler for defense. It is clear as daylight: there is but one step from an appeal for defense to annexation. Thus, the rest of Czechia was annexed after the annexation of Sudetenland. On the day when Slovakia’s Independence was declared following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (March 14, 1939), the ex-president Gaha, having lost half his territory, come to Berlin.

 

From a book devoted to Hitler’s biography one may learn, how the mali-cious fuehrer forced the Czech president suffering from a heart disease to yield his country to the Germans. The author of such a book tries to give a false impression that Czechoslovakia was against it. In fact, the decision passed off without a hitch. Mr. Gaha came to Berlin on his own initiative that was made public as early as March 13, i. e. before Slovakia’s declaration1. His train arrived in Berlin at 22.40. He was received as a distinguished guest, the way that suited the head of a state, with a guard of honor, welcomed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who gave the ex-president’s daughter a bunch of flowers. Then they took Gaha to Adlon, Berlin’s best hotel2.

 

Gaha saw Hitler in his study at one a quarter past one a.m. One would make a blunder to suggest that Gaha spoke about the right of his nation to sovereignty. He spoke quite the opposite and even went as far as to say that he often wondered if Czechoslovakia should be an independent country. That reduced him to asserting the absurdity that he was unalarmed about the fate of his country as it was in the fuehrer’s hands3.

 

After Gaha entrusted the fate of his country to the fuehrer, the latter lost control of himself. He was a tangle of emotions. “He rushed into the rooms of his secretaries and kissed them. “My children, — he said, — today’s the greatest day in my life. I’ll go down in history as the greatest of all Germans”4.

 

Shirer, W. The rise and fall of the Third Reich. P. 322.

 

The ex-president took one of the best accommodations in the hotel where his daughter found the fuehrer’s pleasant surprise — a box of chocolates. Hitler was fond of sweets and thought them the best as a gift.

Ribbentrop, J. von. Memoirs of a Nazi diplomat. M., 1998. P. 158.

 

Bullock, A. P. 219 (incidentally, it is worth noting that in this case it was notimmodesty on Hitler’s part. He simply repeated the headlines of the British papers quoting their premier Chamberlain who said that the fuehrer was “the greatest German of our epoch”. Source: Preparata, G. D. Hitler Inc. How Britain and the USA made the Third Recih. P. 348).


 

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Who made Hitler attack Stalin

 

During the whole war there were no guerillas, nor subversive activities, nor large-scale sabotage in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs were peacefully working for the benefit of the Third Reich, enjoying their favorite beer after working hours. To stir up opposition England sent a raiding force including Kubish and Gabchik to kill Reinhard Heydrich, an SS general and the head of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The details of his assassination prove that there was no guerilla movement in Czechia even 3 years after the occupation! Heydrich was moving in an open car, the only other person being his driver, his holstered pistol at his side the only weapon. He paid for his indiscretion. After killing Heydrich the raiders found no better way to do than hide at a Prague church. The Germans arrested 11 raiders; only one agent managed to get away clear, they chased him as far as a village, where he managed to escape with the help of some residents. His name remains secret. But Lidice, the name of that village, associated with massacre, has gone down in the history of the war. As an act of retaliation, the Germans killed all the men of the village. The following two years was a quiet period again. Only when the war against Germany weighed down the balance, the independent Slovakia (not the occupied Czechia!) rebelled against the occupation (August 1944). The Czechs rose in rebellion only on May 5, 1945, which was a laugh, as it was just before the surrender of the gar-rison of Berlin (May 2) and Germany’s capitulation only a week later (May 8). Comment is needless.

 

Hitler’s joy over the news was remarkable. The Czech president re-quests Hitler to protect Czechia; as a result, he constitutes the Protector-ate of Bohemia and Moravia as an integral territory of the Third Reich! Tiso, the Slovak leader, makes a similar request. It took Hitler only one night to settle the Czech question, unlike the Slovak application that re-quired a longer time. Hitler acceded to their request only on March 16. It may be assumed that he spent some time on analyzing the situation in Czechia after the dissolution of the country. Yet the solution of the Slovak problem shows no ordinary qualities of Germany’s leader. Usually quick in taking decisions, this time Hitler lingers as if deliberately leaving the matter in abeyance.

 

His positive response to Bratislava’s appeal (March 16) does not clear up the status of the Slovak state. Instead of summoning the leaders of the two states to Berlin to sign up the necessary papers, he goes to Vienne (March 18)1.

 

Bullock, A. P. 219.


 

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How Adolf Hitler turned into an “impudent agressor” in just one day

 

“The Defense Pact” between the Reich and Slovakia was signed on March 23 in Berlin by Ribbentrop and the Slovak minister Tuka1.

 


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