DESTRUCTION OF THE SOURCES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT FUEL PRODUCTION
1. In May 1944 the Allied air forces reached a new high level in operational bombardment sorties. Those missions which were not required In direct preparation for the ground invasion were aimed primarily at installations producing oil and aviation gasoline. From England the Eighth AF by day, and, subsequently, the RAF by night carried heavy destruction to these facilities against the strongest flak and smoke defenses ever mounted by the GAF. The Fifteenth AF from Italy delivered simultaneous blows against oil and gasoline production in southern Germany, Silesia, Austria and Roumania. Results were devastating. The Germans worked feverishly to restore damaged plants, but their efforts were frustrated by return missions timed to prevent a major resumption
of production.
2. Raids against oil and gasoline production were continued through the fall and -winter of 1944 with outstanding success (See the Oil Industry Report of the USSBS). German oil reserves were rapidly consumed and by the year's end the situation was desperate. Figure 23, showing production and imports of aviation gasoline, consumption and the decline of reserves, brings this out vividly. As early as June 1944, Production Minister Speer indicated to Hitler hi8 grave concern over th« attacks on oil and gasoline production. He recognized that destruction of fuel production would lead to defeat for the German war machine and recommended an all-out effort to ward off these attacks. Lieutenant General Karl Kollar, Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, gave the following facts relative to oil: "Oil was an excellent target system. The Luftwaffe was using 198,000 tons of aviation gasoline per month in the sunnier of 1943 and later plans called for an increase in this production to 320,000 tons per month... By the spring of 1945, as a result of air attack the Luftwaffe only obtained 6,000 tons per month" (Reference Note 17). 
German aviation gasoline situation
3. From the start of the attacks against fuel production In May 1944, German output declined. The diminishing supply of aviation gasoline resulted at once in serious operational limitations. Training hours, already drastically limited because of fuel shortages, were cut to the bone. Instructors and transport and bomber pilots were given short conversion courses in a last-ditch effort to increase the fighter defenses against the Allied air armada (Reference Note 1). Pressure was brought to conserve fuel even on operational flights. Motor transport, essential for GAF repair and supply was reduced nearly to the vanishing point. Thus the attack on oil, made possible through the attainment of air supremacy, was a prime factor in assuring the permanence of that superiority. The GAF, which had once threatened the ability of the RAJ to continue night bombing attacks, was so completely demoralized that the early months of 1945 saw the RAF carrying out daylight bombing operations in great force with a minimum loss.
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DISRUPTION OF THE GAF SUPPLY AND REPAIR SYSTEMS CAUSED BY ATTACKS ON GERMAN TRANSPORTATION
1. In September of 1944, the strategic air forces shifted primary attention to transportation targets. Here again the RAF and Eighth and Fifteenth AFs combined to deliver a huge tonnage of bombs. The results are well known. Most German experts attribute the final German downfall to the hopeless eoonomic confusion caused by disruption of the transportation system. Wehrmacht officers as well have testified to the difficulties Imposed on operations as a result of these attacks.
2. The GAF repair system Involved the return of seriously damaged aircraft to the factory which manufactured that type. Rail transportation was largely used to move such aircraft from airdrome to factory.
The factories, under the intensive dispersal program, had been scattered over different sections of German territory and consequently were dependent on the railways for delivery of vital components and parts. So also for local repairs and maintenance the GAF depended on rail transport for spare parts and supplies of all sorts, Including gasoline and ammunition. The heavy attacks on marshaling yards not only delayed train movements f6r considerable periods of time but often resulted in destruction of oars carrying GAF freight. At a time when the GAF was suffering severe losses and damage in the air war, speedy repairs to damaged aircraft were essential. Delays in the repair cycle meant that units depended almost entirely on new production for replacements. It is significant that "new production" which was presumably increased nearly threefold in 1944 did not provide the GAF with sufficient fighter aircraft to augment its order of battle and that at no time in 1944 was the GAF able to compete numerically with the Allied air forces. It is clear that the attacks on transportation contributed in no small measure to the dilemma confronting the OAF.
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3. In summary, then, the attacks on oil and transportation launched in mass after air supremacy had been obtained were two vital factors preventing the revival and resurgence of the GAF. The Luftwaffe, whose task it was to ward off attacks on oil and transportation, suffered its death blow in failing to accomplish that task.
REFERENCE NOTES
Ref Note No
1. USSBS, Military Analysis DiTiBion, "OAF Program for Training Day-Fighter Pilots."
2. USSBS, Interview No 32, page 12
3. USSBS, Military Analysis Division, "Relative Performance of British and American Fighters against German Fighters."
4. USSBS, Interview No 8, page 6.
5. USSBS, Interview No 32, page 2.
6. USSBS, Interview No 8, page 7.
7. USSBS, Military Analysis Division, "Armament in the Air War, 1939-1945."
8. Hq AW Intelligence Summary No 45-8, 3O April 1945, page 10.
9. USSBS, Interview No 7, page 2.
10. USSBS, Interview No 56, page 7.
11. USSBS, Interview No 28, page 3,
12. USSBS, Military Analysis Division, "German Air Force - Planning and Requirements in Relation to Production."
13. USSBS, Interview No 80, page 1.
14. USSBS, Interview No 79, page 5.
15. British Air Ministry, ADI(K) Report No. 342/1942.
16. USSBS, Military Analysis Division, "German Air Force - Order of Battle and Losses."
17. USSBS, Interview No. 8, page 7.
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