Quantitative and equivalent restrictions



Kazan (Volga region) Federal University

The Faculty of Law

Department of International and European law

 


An essay on the topic

The four freedoms of the European Union Single market and free competition

By

 

Mikhail Moshenko, 08-938 group

 


Kazan – 2020

 

 


 

Content:

Introduction……………………………………………………………………....3

The free movement of goods…………………………………………………………………………......6

The free movement of persons…………………………………………………………………………... 9

The free movement of services…………………………………………………………………………..11

The free movement of capital……………………………………………………………………………16

The free competition in single market……………………………………………………………………….…...19

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….20


 

Introduction

 

 

In European Union law, the Four Freedoms is a common term for a set of treaty provisions, secondary legislation and court decisions, protecting the ability of goods, services, capital, and labour to move freely within the internal market of the European Union. More precisely, they are:

1.The free movement of goods;

2.The free movement of persons (and citizenship), including free movement of workers, and freedom of establishment;

3.The free movement of services;

4.The free movement of capital.

These four freedoms form part of the substantive law of the EU. Although it is not easy to summarize compactly the activities of the European Union, one can define them as the free flow of economic factors, in pursuit of greater prosperity of the states and their citizens. The law of the Single Market plays a key role there by removing the barriers that member states might otherwise impose on trade originating in other member states.

The four freedoms are fundamental to the common market. Not only goods, but also factors of production can move freely between member states. The single market is intended to be conducive to increased competition, increased specialization and larger economies of scale. Further, the common market allows goods and factors of production to move to the area where they are most valued, thus improving the efficiency of the allocation of resources.

Article 12 of the EC Treaty prohibits discrimination on the basis of nationality and is one of its fundamental provisions. However, on its own it would not suffice to ensure free movement of factors of productions for the simple reason that not all barriers discriminate. For instance, a prohibition on discrimination would make illegal any measure in State A imposing a total ban or a quota on, say, toys from State B. But that provision would not prevent a measure that mandates that all toys sold in State B be packaged in recyclable material, even if such measure can in practice act as a ban or at least make the export of toys to State B more expensive. This difficulty has largely been eliminated in EU law through the concept known as “home country control”. According to this, a product or a service is allowed to access markets of other member states if it has lawfully been made/provided in the state of origin (Home State). Host State rules that present a barrier to this movement will be illegal unless justified by a set of specifically provided rules in the EC Treaty.

The European Single Market, Internal Market or Common Market is a single market comprising the 27 member states of the European Union as well as – with certain exceptions – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway through the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and Switzerland through bilateral treaties.

 

History

 

One of the original core objectives of the European Economic Community (EEC) was the development of a common market offering free movement of goods, service, people and capital (see below). Free movement of goods was established in principle through the customs union between its then-six member states.

However, the EEC struggled to enforce a single market due to the absence of strong decision-making structures. It was difficult to remove intangible barriers with mutual recognition of standards and common regulations due to protectionist attitudes.

In the 1980s, when the economy of the EEC began to lag behind the rest of the developed world, Margaret Thatcher sent Arthur Cockfield, Baron Cockfield, to the Delors Commission to take the initiative to attempt to relaunch the common market. Cockfield wrote and published a White Paper in 1985 identifying 300 measures to be addressed in order to complete a single market. The White Paper was well received and led to the adoption of the Single European Act, a treaty which reformed the decision-making mechanisms of the EEC and set a deadline of 31 December 1992 for the completion of a single market. In the end, it was launched on 1 January 1993.

The new approach, pioneered at the Delors Commission, combined positive and negative integration, relying upon minimum rather than exhaustive harmonization. Negative integration consists of prohibitions imposed on member states banning discriminatory behavior and other restrictive practices. Positive integration consists of approximating laws and standards. Especially important (and controversial) in this respect is the adoption of harmonizing legislation under Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The commission also relied upon the European Court of Justice's Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence, under which member states were obliged to recognise goods which had been legally produced in another member state, unless the member state could justify the restriction by reference to a mandatory requirement. Harmonisation would only be used to overcome barriers created by trade restrictions which survived the Cassis mandatory requirements test, and to ensure essential standards where there was a risk of a race to the bottom. Thus harmonisation was largely used to ensure basic health and safety standards were met.

By 1992 about 90% of the issues had been resolved and in the same year the Maastricht Treaty set about to create an Economic and Monetary Union as the next stage of integration. Work on freedom for services did take longer, and was the last freedom to be implemented, mainly through the Posting of Workers Directive (adopted in 1996) and the Directive on services in the internal market (adopted in 2006).

In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty abolished physical barriers across the internal market by incorporating the Schengen Area within the competences of the EU. The Schengen Agreement implements the abolition of border controls between most member states, common rules on visas, and police and judicial co-operation.

Even as the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 however, some areas pertaining to parts of the four freedoms (especially in the field of services) had not yet been completely opened. Those, along with further work on the economic and monetary union, would see the EU move further to a European Home Market.

 


 

Free movement of goods

 

 

Rules abolishing quantitative restrictions have been essential to the development of the single market in Europe. The free movement of goods is a hugely successful program which has integrated the economies of Europe. It enables any trader or manufacturer in any part of the E.U. to export their goods unhindered to any other Member State in the E.U. For example, German sausage-makers in Bavaria can export their products to any other Member State without trade being impeded by national tariffs.

The prohibition of discriminatory taxation, abolition of customs duties and removal of other administrative rules and barriers which hinder the free movement of goods have been tackled by Articles 34 and 35 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Articles 34 and 35 can be used to strike down national legislation which impedes the free movement of goods. This is a process known as 'negative harmonization.'

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely. In addition under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union article 34, ‘Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States’. the Court of Justice held that this rule meant all "trading rules" that are "enacted by Member States" which could hinder trade "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially" would be caught by article 34. This meant that a Belgian law requiring Scotch whisky imports to have a certificate of origin was unlikely to be lawful. [1]

It discriminated against parallel importers like Mr Dassonville, who could not get certificates from authorities in France, where they bought the Scotch. This "wide test", to determine what could potentially be an unlawful restriction on trade, applies equally to actions by quasi-government bodies, such as the former "Buy Irish" company that had government appointees. It also means states can be responsible for private actors. For instance, in Commission v France French farmer vigilantes were continually sabotaging shipments of Spanish strawberries, and even Belgian tomato imports. France was liable for these hindrances to trade because the authorities "manifestly and persistently abstained" from preventing the sabotage. Generally speaking, if a member state has laws or practices that directly discriminate against imports (or exports under TFEU article 35) then it must be justified under article 36, which outlines all of the justifiable instances. The justifications include public morality, policy or security, "protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants", "national treasures" of "artistic, historic or archaeological value" and "industrial and commercial property". In addition, although not clearly listed, environmental protection can justify restrictions on trade as an over-riding requirement derived from TFEU article 11. The Eyssen v Netherlands case from 1981 outlined a disagreement between the science community and the Dutch government whether niacin in cheese posed a public risk. As public risk falls under article 36, meaning that a quantitative restriction can be imposed, it justified the import restriction against the Eyssen cheese company by the Dutch government.

More generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged that fundamental human rights should take priority over all trade rules. So, in Schmidberger v Austriathe Court of Justice held that Austria did not infringe article 34 by failing to ban a protest that blocked heavy traffic passing over the A13, Brenner Autobahn, en route to Italy. Although many companies, including Mr Schmidberger's German undertaking, were prevented from trading, the Court of Justice reasoned that freedom of association is one of the "fundamental pillars of a democratic society", against which the free movement of goods had to be balanced, and was probably subordinate. If a member state does appeal to the article 36 justification, the measures it takes have to be applied proportionately. This means the rule must be pursue a legitimate aim and (1) be suitable to achieve the aim, (2) be necessary, so that a less restrictive measure could not achieve the same result, and (3) be reasonable in balancing the interests of free trade with interests in article 36.

 

 

Quantitative and equivalent restrictions

 

 

Free movement of goods within the European Union is achieved by a customs union and the principle of non-discrimination. The EU manages imports from non-member states, duties between member states are prohibited, and imports circulate freely.

Articles 34 and 35 of the TFEU are provisions which prohibit quantitative restrictions (QR's) and measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions (MEQR's).

They applies to The State institutions themselves /Bodies which derive their power from public law, including central, regional and local government, or any semi-public body like a quango.

Also, measures adopted by professional bodies, like the Royal Pharmaceutical Society, on which national legislation has conferred regulatory or disciplinary powers counted as 'measures taken by a Member State' subject to what is now Article 34.

Quantitative restrictions are not just legislation; they can be administrative acts.

Bans on imports can count as quantitative restrictions.

It also includes quota systems. Even a quota system applying to a small part of the country counts as a quantitative restriction.

Forcing importers to have licences is also an example of a quantitative restriction. Although the courts have sometimes decided that it is a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction (MEQR).

Directive 70/50 highlighted how QR's and MEQR's did not have to be legally binding. For example, the Buy Irish case, where it was held that Irish policies were influencing traders and frustrating the aims of the Union.

The concept of MEQR is wider in scope than quantitative restrictions.

MEQRs can be divided into two different scopes:

1.Distinctly Applicable Measures: Measures which apply exclusively to imports or exports.

2.Indistinctly Applicable Measures: Measures which apply to both imports or exports, AND domestic goods.

The difference between distinctly and indistinctly applicable measures is that indistinctly applicable measures can be justified if they are necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements. For example, environmental protection, promotion of national culture, etc.

The range of "goods" (or "products") covered by the term "free movement of goods" "is as wide as the range of goods in existence". Goods are only covered if they have economic value, i.e. they can be valued in money and are capable of forming the subject of commercial transactions. Works of art, coins which are no longer in circulation and water are noted as examples of "goods". Fish are goods, but a European Court of Justice ruling in 1999 stated that fishing rights are not goods.

 


 

The free movement of persons

 

 

The free movement of people means EU citizens can move freely between member states for whatever reason (or without any reason) and may reside in any member state they choose if they are not an undue burden on the social welfare system or public safety in their chosen member state. This required reduction of administrative formalities and greater recognition of professional qualifications of other states. Fostering the free movement of people has been a major goal of European integration since the 1950s

The task of the European Community is to achieve the common market, and an economic and monetary union. In order to do this, it is necessary to achieve ‘the abolition as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.’The main obstacle to free movement of persons between the Member States are border controls on persons.

Part 3 Title III EC sets out the specific rights granted to individuals within the

Community in order to give effect to the abolition of obstacles to their movement—the free movement of workers, the self-employed ie establishment—and service providers and recipients, nationals of one Member States within the territory of another. The rights of the individual in each case in the Treaty are circumscribed by the state’s appreciation of the needs of public policy, security and health.[2]

Since its foundation, the Treaties sought to enable people to pursue their life goals in any country through free movement. Reflecting the economic nature of the project, the European Community originally focused upon free movement of workers: as a "factor of production». However, from the 1970s, this focus shifted towards developing a more "social" Europe. Free movement was increasingly based on "citizenship", so that people had rights to empower them to become economically and socially active, rather than economic activity being a precondition for rights. This means the basic "worker" rights in TFEU article 45 function as a specific expression of the general rights of citizens in TFEU articles 18 to 21. According to the Court of Justice, a "worker" is anybody who is economically active, which includes everyone in an employment relationship, "under the direction of another person" for "remuneration". A job, however, need not be paid in money for someone to be protected as a worker. For example, in Steymann v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, a German man claimed the right to residence in the Netherlands, while he volunteered plumbing and household duties in the Bhagwan community, which provided for everyone's material needs irrespective of their contributions. The Court of Justice held that Mr Steymann was entitled to stay, so long as there was at least an "indirect quid pro quo" for the work he did. Having "worker" status means protection against all forms of discrimination by governments, and employers, in access to employment, tax, and social security rights. By contrast a citizen, who is "any person having the nationality of a Member State" (TFEU article 20(1)), has rights to seek work, vote in local and European elections, but more restricted rights to claim social security. In practice, free movement has become politically contentious as nationalist political parties appear to have utilized concerns about immigrants taking jobs and benefits.

First, article 4 of the Citizens Rights Directive 2004 says every citizen has the right to depart a member state with a valid passport or national identity card. This has historical importance for central and eastern Europe, when the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall denied its citizens the freedom to leave. Article 5 gives every citizen a right of entry, subject to national border controls. Schengen Area countries (of which Ireland is not included) have abolished the need to show travel documents, and police searches at borders, altogether. These reflect the general principle of free movement in TFEU article 21. Second, article 6 allows every citizen to stay three months in another member state, whether economically active or not. Article 7 allows stays over three months with evidence of "sufficient resources... not to become a burden on the social assistance system". Articles 16 and 17 give a right to permanent residence after 5 years without conditions. Third, TEU article 10(3) requires the right to vote in the local constituencies for the European Parliament wherever a citizen lives.

All EU citizens have the right to child support, education, social security and other assistance in EU member states. To ensure people contribute fairly to the communities they live in, there can be qualifying periods of residence and work up to five years.

Fourth, and more debated, article 24 requires that the longer an EU citizen stays in a host state, the more rights they have to access public and welfare services, on the basis of equal treatment. This reflects general principles of equal treatment and citizenship in TFEU articles 18 and 20. In a simple case, in Sala v Freistaat Bayern the Court of Justice held that a Spanish woman who had lived in (Germany) for 25 years and had a baby was entitled to child support, without the need for a residence permit, because Germans did not need one. In Trojani v Centre public d’aide sociale de Bruxelles, a French man who lived in Belgium for two years was entitled to the "minimex" allowance from the state for a minimum living wage. In Grzelczyk v Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve a French student, who had lived in Belgium for three years, was entitled to receive the "minimex" income support for his fourth year of study. Similarly, in R (Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing the Court of Justice held that it was lawful to require a French UCL economics student to have lived in the UK for three years before receiving a student loan, but not that he had to have additional "settled status". Similarly, in Commission v Austria, Austria was not entitled to restrict its university places to Austrian students to avoid "structural, staffing and financial problems" if (mainly German) foreign students applied, unless it proved there was an actual problem. However, in Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, the Court of Justice held that the German government was entitled to deny child support to a Romanian mother who had lived in Germany for 3 years, but had never worked. Because she lived in Germany for over 3 months, but under 5 years, she had to show evidence of "sufficient resources", since the Court reasoned the right to equal treatment in article 24 within that time depended on lawful residence under article 7.

 


 

Free movement of services

 

 

As well as creating rights for "workers" who generally lack bargaining power in the market, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union also protects the "freedom of establishment" in article 49, and "freedom to provide services" in article 56

In Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milanothe Court of Justice held that to be "established" means to participate in economic life "on a stable and continuous basis", while providing "services" meant pursuing activity more "on a temporary basis". This meant that a lawyer from Stuttgart, who had set up chambers in Milan and was censured by the Milan Bar Council for not having registered, should claim for breach of establishment freedom, rather than service freedom. However, the requirements to be registered in Milan before being able to practice would be allowed if they were non-discriminatory, "justified by imperative requirements in the general interest" and proportionately applied. All people or entities that engage in economic activity, particularly the self-employed, or "undertakings" such as companies or firms, have a right to set up an enterprise without unjustified restrictions.

The Court of Justice has held that both a member state government and a private party can hinder freedom of establishment, so article 49 has both "vertical" and "horizontal" direct effect. In Reyners v Belgiumthe Court of Justice held that a refusal to admit a lawyer to the Belgian bar because he lacked Belgian nationality was unjustified. TFEU article 49 says states are exempt from infringing others' freedom of establishment when they exercise "official authority", but this did an advocate's work[clarification needed] (as opposed to a court's) was not official. By contrast in Commission v Italy the Court of Justice held that a requirement for lawyers in Italy to comply with maximum tariffs unless there was an agreement with a client was not a restriction. The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice held the commission had not proven that this had any object or effect of limiting practitioners from entering the market. Therefore, there was no prima facie infringement freedom of establishment that needed to be justified. [3]

In regard to companies, the Court of Justice held in R (Daily Mail and General Trust plc) v HM Treasury that member states could restrict a company moving its seat of business, without infringing TFEU article 49. This meant the Daily Mail newspaper's parent company could not evade tax by shifting its residence to the Netherlands without first settling its tax bills in the UK. The UK did not need to justify its action, as rules on company seats were not yet harmonised.

By contrast, in Centros Ltd v Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen the Court of Justice found that a UK limited company operating in Denmark could not be required to comply with Denmark's minimum share capital rules. UK law only required £1 of capital to start a company, while Denmark's legislature took the view companies should only be started up if they had 200,000 Danish krone (around €27,000) to protect creditors if the company failed and went insolvent.

The Court of Justice held that Denmark's minimum capital law infringed Centros Ltd's freedom of establishment and could not be justified, because a company in the UK could admittedly provide services in Denmark without being established there, and there were less restrictive means of achieving the aim of creditor protection. This approach was criticised as potentially opening the EU to unjustified regulatory competition, and a race to the bottom in standards, like in the US where the state of Delaware attracts most companies and is often argued to have the worst standards of accountability of boards, and low corporate taxes as a result. Similarly in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction GmbH the Court of Justice held that a German court could not deny a Dutch building company the right to enforce a contract in Germany on the basis that it was not validly incorporated in Germany. Although restrictions on freedom of establishment could be justified by creditor protection, labour rights to participate in work, or the public interest in collecting taxes, denial of capacity went too far: it was an "outright negation" of the right of establishment. [4]

However, in Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt the Court of Justice affirmed again that because corporations are created by law, they are in principle subject to any rules for formation that a state of incorporation wishes to impose. This meant that the Hungarian authorities could prevent a company from shifting its central administration to Italy while it still operated and was incorporated in Hungary. Thus, the court draws a distinction between the right of establishment for foreign companies (where restrictions must be justified), and the right of the state to determine conditions for companies incorporated in its territory, although it is not entirely clear why.

The "freedom to provide services" under TFEU article 56 applies to people who provide services "for remuneration", especially commercial or professional activity. Dutch lawyer moved to Belgium while advising a client in a social security case, and was told he could not continue because Dutch law said only people established in the Netherlands could give legal advice. The Court of Justice held that the freedom to provide services applied, it was directly effective, and the rule was probably unjustified: having an address in the member state would be enough to pursue the legitimate aim of good administration of justice.

Case law states that the treaty provisions relating to the freedom to provide services do not apply in situations where the service, service provider and other relevant facts are confined within a single member state. An early Council Directive from 26 July 1971 included works contracts within the scope of services, and provided for the abolition of restrictions on freedom to provide services in respect of public works contracts.

The Court of Justice has held that secondary education falls outside the scope of article 56, because usually the state funds it, though higher education does not. Health care generally counts as a service. In Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds Mrs Geraets-Smits claimed she should be reimbursed by Dutch social insurance for costs of receiving treatment in Germany. The Dutch health authorities regarded the treatment as unnecessary, so she argued this restricted the freedom (of the German health clinic) to provide services. Several governments submitted that hospital services should not be regarded as economic, and should not fall within article 56. But the Court of Justice held that health care was a "service" even though the government (rather than the service recipient) paid for the service.

National authorities could be justified in refusing to reimburse patients for medical services abroad if the health care received at home was without undue delay, and it followed "international medical science" on which treatments counted as normal and necessary. The Court requires that the individual circumstances of a patient justify waiting lists, and this is also true in the context of the UK's National Health Service.[110] Aside from public services, another sensitive field of services are those classified as illegal. Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht held that the Netherlands' regulation of cannabis consumption, including the prohibitions by some municipalities on tourists (but not Dutch nationals) going to coffee shops, fell outside article 56 altogether. The Court of Justice reasoned that narcotic drugs were controlled in all member states, and so this differed from other cases where prostitution or other quasi-legal activity was subject to restriction.

If an activity does fall within article 56, a restriction can be justified under article 52 or over-riding requirements developed by the Court of Justice. In Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiën a business that sold commodities futures (with Merrill Lynch and another banking firm) attempted to challenge a Dutch law prohibiting cold calling customers. The Court of Justice held the Dutch prohibition pursued a legitimate aim to prevent "undesirable developments in securities trading" including protecting the consumer from aggressive sales tactics, thus maintaining confidence in the Dutch markets.

In Omega Spielhallen GmbH v Bonn a "laserdrome" business was banned by the Bonn council. It bought fake laser gun services from a UK firm called Pulsar Ltd, but residents had protested against "playing at killing" entertainment. The Court of Justice held that the German constitutional value of human dignity, which underpinned the ban, did count as a justified restriction on freedom to provide services. In Liga Portuguesa de Futebol v Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa the Court of Justice also held that the state monopoly on gambling, and a penalty for a Gibraltar firm that had sold internet gambling services, was justified to prevent fraud and gambling where people's views were highly divergent. [5]

The ban was proportionate as this was an appropriate and necessary way to tackle the serious problems of fraud that arise over the internet. In the Services Directive a group of justifications were codified in article 16 that the case law has developed.

 


 

Free Movement of capital

 

 

Capital markets, where debt and equity instruments are traded, have experienced huge transformations over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Markets have grown in size, depth and complexity, to a point where a single problem can have ramifications in different directions all over the globe.The physical location of the market is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Markets are virtual and intangible. The grand stock exchange buildings which many capitals harbor have become empty shells, symbols of past times of the place where traders met and physically formed the market. Today, technological developments have replaced all that, and the market is formed by the screens placed in front of thousands of traders all over the world. The stock exchange buildings have at best been left with noisy machines which match trades, execute orders and disseminate information.

In contrast to the United States, banks are by far the most important intermediaries on the European market. Whereas in the US the financial system is fragmented as a result of historical and regulatory developments, Europe's capital markets are dominated by universal banks. The expectation that EMU will lead to a more market-based disintermediated financial system in Europe needs to be seen in this perspective.[6]

Free movement of capital was traditionally seen as the fourth freedom, after goods, workers and persons, services and establishment. The original Treaty of Rome required that restrictions on free capital flows only be removed to the extent necessary for the common market. From the Treaty of Maastricht, now in TFEU article 63, "all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited". This means capital controls of various kinds are prohibited, including limits on buying currency, limits on buying company shares or financial assets, or government approval requirements for foreign investment. By contrast, taxation of capital, including corporate tax, capital gains tax and financial transaction tax, are not affected so long as they do not discriminate by nationality. According to the Capital Movement Directive 1988, Annex I, 13 categories of capital which must move free are covered. In Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren the Court of Justice held that for investments in companies, the capital rules, rather than freedom of establishment rules, were engaged if an investment did not enable a "definite influence" through shareholder voting or other rights by the investor. That case held a Dutch Wealth Tax Act 1964 unjustifiably exempted Dutch investments, but not Mr Baars' investments in an Irish company, from the tax: the wealth tax, or exemptions, had to be applied equally. On the other hand, TFEU article 65(1) does not prevent taxes that distinguish taxpayers based on their residence or the location of an investment (as taxes commonly focus on a person's actual source of profit) or any measures to prevent tax evasion. Apart from tax cases, largely following from the opinions of Advocate General Maduro, a series of cases held that government owned golden shares were unlawful. In Commission v Germany the Commission claimed the German Volkswagen Act 1960 violated article 63, in that §2(1) restricted any party having voting rights exceeding 20% of the company, and §4(3) allowed a minority of 20% of shares held by the Lower Saxony government to block any decisions. Although this was not an impediment to actual purchase of shares, or receipt of dividends by any shareholder, the Court of Justice's Grand Chamber agreed that it was disproportionate for the government's stated aim of protecting workers or minority shareholders. Similarly, in Commission v Portugal the Court of Justice held that Portugal infringed free movement of capital by retaining golden shares in Portugal Telecom that enabled disproportionate voting rights, by creating a "deterrent effect on portfolio investments" and reducing "the attractiveness of an investment". This suggested the Court's preference that a government, if it sought public ownership or control, should nationalise in full the desired proportion of a company in line with TFEU article 345.

Capital within the EU may be transferred in any amount from one country to another (except that Greece currently has capital controls restricting outflows, and Cyprus imposed capital controls between 2013 and April 2015). All intra-EU transfers in euro are considered as domestic payments and bear the corresponding domestic transfer costs. This includes all member States of the EU, even those outside the eurozone providing the transactions are carried out in euro. Credit/debit card charging and ATM withdrawals within the Eurozone are also charged as domestic; however, paper-based payment orders, like cheques, have not been standardised so these are still domestic-based. The ECB has also set up a clearing system, TARGET, for large euro transactions.[7]

The final stage of completely free movement of capital was thought to require a single currency and monetary policy, eliminating the transaction costs and fluctuations of currency exchange. Following a Report of the Delors Commission in 1988, the Treaty of Maastricht made economic and monetary union an objective, first by completing the internal market, second by creating a European System of Central Banks to co-ordinate common monetary policy, and third by locking exchange rates and introducing a single currency, the euro. Today, 19 member states have adopted the euro, while 9 member states have either determined to opt-out or their accession has been delayed, particularly since the Eurozone crisis. According to TFEU articles 119 and 127, the objective of the European Central Bank and other central banks ought to be price stability. This has been criticized for apparently being superior to the objective of full employment in the Treaty on European Union article 3.[8]

Within the building on the Investment Plan for Europe, for a closer integration of capital markets, in 2015, the Commission adopted the Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (CMU) setting out a list of key measures to achieve a true single market for capital in Europe, which deepens the existing Banking Union, because this revolves around disintermediated, market-based forms of financing, which should represent an alternative to the traditionally predominant (in Europe) bank-based financing channel. The EU's political and economic context call for strong and competitive capital markets to finance the EU economy. The CMU project is a political signal to strengthen the Single Market as a project of all 28 Member States, instead of just the Eurozone countries, and sent a strong signal to the UK to remain an active part of the EU, before Brexit.


 


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