Why the west likes neither Molotov, nor Ribbentrop 5 страница
The historians cunningly refrain from giving the reader the essence of the German proposition. Danzig did not belong to Poland and was governed by the “international community”. That is why Poland was expected to give her consent not to stand in the way for the “independent state” of Danzig to join Germany.
Ribbentrop, J. von. P. 164–168.
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To encourage Poland England guaranteed her military defense, though Poland had not asked for that1.
Five days later, on March 26, 1939 the ambassador Lipski handed Rib-bentrop a memorandum of the Polish government that “brusquely declined the German proposition concerning Danzig2. Lipski dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s, getting on Germany’s bad side by the following utterance: “Any further efforts to fulfill the German plans, especially those concerning the cession of Danzig to the Reich, will lead to war with Poland”3.
This meant a complete change in Poland’s diplomacy. The intimate friendship between the two nations vanished into thin air. The point was that Hitler was given to understand that Poland would no longer consent to negotiations with his regime and was prepared to stand to her guns and, at worst, go to war. Warsaw took some unmistakably hostile actions to deprive Berlin of any illusions: most officers of the Polish embassy in Berlin sent home their families; the Polish students staying in the Ger-man capital also went home; all the Polish consuls were ordered to burn secret papers and archives. Besides, on March 23 Poland declared partial mobilization4. The next day after the Germans received the “brusque” memorandum (March 27, 1939), the Polish president issued a decree on supplementary appropriations for the national defense equal to the amount of 1.2 billion zlotys.
All that was done by a country that had a non- aggression pact with Germany! It was the Poland that only a month before (even a week before!) was regarded to be the German fuehrer’s main team-mate in his journey to the East. But as soon as the journey was put off, Poland declared partial mobilization. That was a signal that presupposed war! It is noteworthy that Germany did not actually threaten Poland: there was no mobilization, nor
warlike whoops against Warsaw. The Germans had no campaign plan to wage a war against Poland! Even those who most ardently accuse Hitlerof aggressiveness have to admit that he gave an order to work out the first strike against Poland only on April 1, 19395. The draft plan was ready by mid-April 19396.
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Ribbentrop, J. von. P. 168–169.
Ibid. P. 169.
Ibid. P. 169.
Meltyukhov, M. Stalin’s lost chance. P. 63.
Ibid. P. 63.
The Nuremberg Trials. V. 1. M., 1955. P. 343.
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What motivated the leader of Nazi Germany to unleash his first war? It became quite clear to him that it was a mistake to leave the “London-run” Poland in the rearward. That Polish “plug” jamming the way to the East was turning into a pistol held to Germany’s head. If an enduring friendship might be sacrificed by the Poles overnight (!), at a whistle from London, they could not be trusted, indeed. But Hitler could not help fighting; it was not because he was a maniacal aggressor, but because the country was extremely militarized. Now it was time for him to get his bearings, to determine his further movement. But wherever he went, East or West, Poland might strike Germany any time that London would find fit. At that, it is essential to realize that the Poles were working contrary to their own interests. The brusque form with which their high officials chose to communicate with Hitler’s ministers could only provoke Germany into a conflict with no po-litical dividends for Poland.
On March 31, 1939, i. e. 16 days after Hitler occupied Prague, Britain was ready to fight Germany. Britain that had not heretofore “noticed” Hitler’s ag-gressiveness, the power that even had ceded to him Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rheinland and Saarland without a grumble, now was in a bellicose mood. On that day the Premier Chamberlain made a statement to emphasize that “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces”, Britain would feel bound to lend Poland all sup-port in her power1.
The Poles were more surprised to hear of such a turn in politics than anybody else. England had always tried to avoid making commitments, but at that moment it did something unasked for. Here is how Winston Churchill comments on Britain’s foreign policy reversal: “Yet now at last the two Western democracies declared themselves ready to stake their lives upon the territorial integrity of Poland. History, which, we are told, is mainly the record of the crimes, follies, and miseries of mankind, may be scoured and ransacked to find a parallel to this sudden and complete reversal of five or six years’ policy of easy-going placatory appeasement, and its transforma-tion almost overnight into a readiness to accept an obviously imminent war on far worse conditions and on the greatest scale”2.
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The USSR in its struggle on the eve of World War II (September 1938 — August 1939). Documents and materials. M., 1971. P. 290.
Churchill, W. The Second World War. P. 311.
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A truer word was never spoken. But Churchill leaves out one essential point: England and France never intended to wage a real war against Ger-many. As a result of incredible political pressure, Hitler was just obliged, as the leaders of England and France might have thought, to let them put a choke collar on him and make him “the watchdog” of the West.
A week later Chamberlain’s statement turned into an agreement between Poland and England. The author of this book is far from trying to whitewash the Nazi aggressors and defend the murderers of many millions of Soviet people by presenting them as victims of circumstances. But it is essential to understand the chain of events that led this country to her most terrible night in history — the small hors of June 22, 1941. That is why speaking the truth is preferable, though it may go against the grain of some personalities.
It was not Germany, but Poland and England that violated their treaties! Poland broke the Polish-German Treaty by declaring mobiliza-tion and broke it again by accepting the English guarantees of her security. The treaty between Poland and Germany excluded any bilateral conflict, and the signing of an agreement with England bound the Poles to fight the Germans in case of war between England and Germany. Besides, this agreement including the provision of guarantees of security contradicted the German-British Pact, the “insurance” paper that Chamberlain was waving in his hand on his return home from Munich. As the reader remembers, the Munich amendment agreement pointed out that neither Germany, not England could make any political commitments without mutual consulta-tions. As is known, Britain undertook the commitment to declare war on Germany in case of its military conflict with Poland!
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At one stroke the European diplomats violated their treaties with Ger-many and thus displayed the necessary degree (as they thought) of hard line in order to suppress him, which, in fact, was nothing but political delusion of all diplomatic measures. With the first change of a political situation, the whole system of interstate treaties goes down the drain with dispatch. Hitler would act accordingly later, but it should be borne in mind that he was no pioneer in this sphere. The peculiarity of the situation was that England was now ready to go to war not only for the sake of Poland. It was not the security of only Poland that England guaranteed, but that of Romania, too1.
April 13, 1939. The guarantees to Romania blocked the oil supplies to Germany. It was impossible to go to war without oil, and it was dangerous to put pressure to
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Following Britain France also gave her guarantees of security. This meant that both the powers had blocked the German foreign policy in all direc-tions. Germany could not make a move in any direction without asking for permission from London or taking a chance of war with England. Yet, there was one available direction, the most acceptable one for the gentlemen at 10 Downing Street.
But the hard line with Hitler gave the contrary effect. In his famous speech on April 28, 1939 Hitler tore up the non-aggression pact with Poland and the naval treaty with England. It was not because Hitler was after “seiz-ing the whole world”, but because de facto Poland and England had already denounced their agreements with Germany and concluded an agreement with one another.
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Instead of consenting to the British “tutelage”, Hitler launched a chal-lenge against his “boss” and determined to liquidate Poland as a hostile and unpredictable force. But he had no further aggressive plans so far. He had no step-by-step plan of “conquering the world”. He had no campaign plan of crushing the USSR. The German headquarters had no campaign plans to attack France and England. The Germans had only one worked-out military plan — to strike Poland (Fall WeiЯ) — and was launching the Polish campaign without having elaborated operations in the West1. The German leader “of genius” was leaning into the wind rather than running with it, trying to respond to the changing international situation. One might just as well hazard the following guess: the whole world war on the part of Germany was one big improvisation!
What aim did the West set trying to persuade Poland to take a tough line with Germany? The aim was to provoke a conflict between Germany and the USSR. That was supposed to happen, no matter what Hitler did. If he is in a funk to fight with the West and attacks Stalin instead, that’s good. If his heart does not fail him and he attacks Poland, that’s good, too. Bearing in mind what the Third Reich had been reared for, the Soviet leadership would hardly sit idle, watching the German Army nearing the Soviet borders. The most sensible way out for Stalin in a conflict with Germany would be to
bear on Romania, because it might at best lead to war with England, France and even Romania. What was left to do? The only way was to consent to the British “dog-collar” (Bullock, A. V. 2. P. 224).
Falin, V. P. 108.
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deploy the troops on the Polish territory to prevent the German Army from drawing near the frontier.
Thus, the Polish-German conflict would naturally turn into a war between the USSR and Germany, which was a strategy. Every power was involved in this problem: England, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. But the goals of diplomats from different countries were diametrically op-posite. The following half a year, before Germany attacked Poland, would be a period of scramble between diplomats and spies.
What challenges did the diplomats of different countries meet?
‰ Hitler’s primary objective was to prevent the USSR from enteringa European war. Hoping that England and France would betray their ally (Poland) again, he intended to liquidate Poland without the risk of coming to grips with the Russians. Then he could afford to come to terms with Britain again, this time standing on dignity and equal treatment.
‰ Stalin’s primary objective was to keep Germany from attacking the USSR.The execution of this objective might require that Poland be sacrificed, so be it. What “remorse” could Stalin feel? Poland was an enemy indeed, anxious to march into Moscow hand-in-hand with Hitler. Now he had a chance to let one aggressor do the dirty work of liquidating another aggressor. Why would the Russian leader refuse?
Yet, Stalin had another variant. By concluding an agreement with England, France and Poland he could lean on a joint effort to crush the aggressor in case of war. But it is clear as daylight that the leaders of the West democracies would never conclude such an agreement. Indeed, such a plan was never realized. Even when it was evident that German aggression was inevitable, Poland that obediently followed London’s instructions refused to conclude a treaty of union with the USSR. Conse-quently, Stalin had no alternative, except concluding a treaty with Hitler.
‰ The primary objective of England and France was to play Germanyagainst Russia. In the situation of Hitler’s new mode of behavior they introduced a minor variation, but basically the scenario had not changed. They decided to provoke Hitler into attacking Poland, which implied the outset of a conflict between Germany and the USSR. But Hitler was no idiot. He remembered the world war too well and would never make up his mind to attack Poland, because in an upcoming war this might
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lead to fighting on two fronts: against the USSR on one front and against England and France on the other front. To encourage Hitler to attack Poland it was necessary for his Western partners to assure him that they would not intervene on behalf of Poland. At that, both England and France were supposed to remain in the shade and, in accordance with their old plan, enter into the war after the Germans and the Russians had exhausted each other…
Now that the reader fully understands the objectives of all the partici-pants of that political game, it is possible to estimate their decisions. On April 16, 1939 Stalin attempted to propose that Europe should take joint actions to stop Hitler. The Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov told the Brit-ish ambassador that the USSR was ready to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with Britain and France1. The USSR had concrete proposals, and that was why they went unanswered. The Soviet Union found it necessary to determine firm mutual commitments of all the parties concerned. Instead of this, England suggested that the USSR should just express support of her Western partners in case of attack2. When Litvinov suggested that Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia should enjoy security guarantees, England did not give any definite answer3. Why? One should remember that the Baltic territory was necessary to deploy an army for attacking Russia. Given the guarantees, how can Hitler occupy this territory? And if he cannot do this, how can the German troops be arrayed for attack? That was why the British diplomats preferred to keep their mouths shut…
In late April it was possible to avert an upcoming war. On April 30, 1939 Hitler took some unofficial steps to find common ground with his former English “friends” by warning them, that unless an agreement was made with them, he would have to negotiate with the Kremlin. But the English diplomats did not believe that the Bolsheviks could come to an agreement with the Nazis. It was no coincidence that they had tried to place in power the bitterest enemy of the communist regime.
The tactic of the English, as well as the French diplomacy was quite simple: to drag on the negotiations with the USSR, without concluding any
Meltyukhov, M. P. 65.
Poland was west of the USSR. So if Stalin undertook to support “the western neighbors”, i. e. the Poles, it would make an excuse for waging a war with Germany.
Meltyukhov, M. P. 68.
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agreements, to give Stalin the impression that such agreements would be soon reached. That was one side of the British diplomatic game. The other side was related to making Hitler attack Poland. It was a convenient situa-tion with England and France, having no commitments, and Germany at the doorstep of the USSR. Later they would only have to stir one of the parties to the conflict so that it might start the ball rolling, and a Russian-German war would be secured.
Out of 75 days devoted to the “exchange of opinions” between the Soviet and Western diplomats 16 days had been spent to prepare the answers to the questions, the other 59 days wasted on delays and procrastination on the part of the Western powers. The British and French diplomats piled up difficulties out of thin air even in discussing trifling matters. Had they really had good will, all such questions could have been easily settled. Like a winning soccer team, they were trying to run out the clock1.
As for Poland, it was destined to repeat the annexation story of Austria, or Czechoslovakia. The Poles were to be sacrificed for the sake of political rationale. England had provoked Poland to sever friendly relations with Germany, and the further objective was to sustain the acute state of the German-Polish crisis. Poland was going to get nothing but promises. Of course, the treaty between England and Poland contained the provision that England would act on the side of Poland in case of Hitler’s attack. There is a sophisticated notion in diplomacy — ratification; it suggests good will and, at the same time, reluctance of responsibility, for the time being. Britain chose a temporizing policy in ratifying the Polish-British treaty! It was signed on April 6, 1939, but came into effect, i. e. was ratified only on August 252. Had Germany attacked Poland earlier, England would not have been liable to it.
The trustful Poles were ready to discuss peculiarities of routing the Ger-man Army. On May 23, 1939 a British delegation headed by General Clayton arrived in Warsaw for negotiations. No concrete decisions were taken, no
Volkov, F. D. Behind the scenes of World War II. P. 256–257.
England held back on ratifying the treaty till the last moment and did it only on April 25, 1939, because on April 23 the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed. Otherwise, England and France would never have ratified their treaties with Poland.
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